Automaticity in Political Decision Making

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Summary and Keywords

Rather than being a slow, deliberative, and fully conscious process, political thinking is steeped in automaticity: that is, it is fast, relatively effortless, and often unconscious. Political and social psychologists have made great strides in measuring different components of this automaticity while pinpointing its influence on different types of citizens under a variety of social and political circumstances. There are manifold ways through which automaticity seeps into political cognition by focusing on various important domains of political decision-making, including intergroup relations, identity and information processing, and candidate evaluation. Multiple research frontiers in political science exist where automaticity can help break new conceptual and theoretical ground as it relates to people's thinking, judgment, and evaluation of politics.

Keywords: affective responses, cognitive responses, dual-process models, effortless and effortful thinking, uncontrollable and controllable thoughts, unconscious and conscious processes, political decision making

Introduction

> *The mind is like an iceberg, it floats with one-seventh of its bulk above water.*
>
> —Sigmund Freud

Famous words from a famous man. Sigmund Freud, the pioneering father of psychoanalysis, is credited with this now prescient observation. His point was simple and arresting at once. In order to truly understand human thinking—its origins, its mechanics, and its underlying motivations—one had to firmly grasp the reins of the human unconscious. Specifically, Freud argued, psychoanalysts had to plumb the depths of a person's dreams in order to piece together an interpretative account for why they behaved the way they behaved.[1]

The thrust of Freud's idea was too ahead of its time, however. Under the stress of scrutiny, criticism, and the lack of penetrating tools, psychoanalysis withered away. But nearly a century after Freud's idea first made splashes, cadres of social and political psychologists have picked a new horse and restored it with fresh reins in order to better grasp the essence of human thinking. *Automaticity* is this equine's name. Outfitted with a tougher

conceptual harness and more robust methodology, scholars are increasingly concluding that the mind *is* like an iceberg. Indeed, for all the attention paid by researchers to the tiny tip of human conscious thought (Erisen, Lodge, & Taber, 2014; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Pérez, 2016), there is a deeper, more fundamental, and much larger aspect of cognition driving people's thinking, with *automaticity* as its signature trait (Gawronski & Payne, 2010).

This article centers on *automaticity* and its relationship to political cognition. Many political scientists still subscribe to the outdated notion that political thinking is undertaken by individuals in a strictly deliberative, often effortful, and certainly self-aware fashion (Pérez, 2016). Yet mounting research demonstrates that there is a part of political thinking that is relatively spontaneous, uncontrollable, and effortless—in a word, *automatic* (e.g., Nosek, Graham, & Hawkins, 2010; Pérez, 2013; Lodge & Taber, 2005). The goal of this article is to bring this *automaticity* into sharper relief and to demonstrate that, rather than being a curious side-show to political thought, it is the opening act to what most political scientists consider "real" thinking.

The Four Horsemen of Automaticity

More than 20 years ago, the social psychologist John Bargh published a field-defining book chapter titled "The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition" (Bargh, 1994; see also Bargh, 1997, 2006, 2007; Baumeister & Bargh, 2014; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Bargh's article had a simple yet tricky goal: to clarify the meaning of "automaticity," a concept that some psychologists had loosely used to describe several forms of human thinking that seemed different from the more deliberative, effortful, and self-aware reasoning most psychologists generally focused on.

Bargh defined "automaticity" as human thinking distinguished by a quartet of traits: intention, control, efficiency, and awareness—the four horsemen in his chapter's title. One of the lasting lessons in Bargh's essay is the notion that automaticity entails a form of cognition that falls on a spectrum. Thus, automaticity characterizes all human thinking to a degree, such that it can be weakly automatic, strongly automatic, or somewhere in between. Because all cognition displays one, some, or all of these four traits to a certain extent, the onus is on researchers who study automaticity to specify and corroborate its presence.

For Bargh's (1994) part, he stipulated that automaticity is differentiated, first, by its *unintentional* nature. That is, people do not voluntarily engage an automatic process; rather, it transpires spontaneously, without the mind's conscious permission. Once initiated, however, an automatic process is generally difficult for a person to *control*. In other words, willfully directing an automatic process is exceedingly challenging, if not impossible. This relative lack of active direction over automatic processes can be traced to their *efficiency*—they require minimal cognitive effort and resources on the part of individuals. Finally, automatic processes are often accompanied by a lack of *awareness* on the part of people.

Specifically, individuals can be unaware that a cognitive process is taking place; they can be unaware of the output of this process; and/or they can be unaware of how this process impacts them behaviorally (Gawronski, Hoffmann, & Wilbur, 2006; Pérez, 2013). Thus, to count as automatic, a cognitive process must contain one, some, or all of these traits to some degree (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Burdein, Lodge, & Taber, 2006; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002).

This automaticity in human thinking is aptly illustrated by people's ability to detect, learn, and encode environmental regularities to memory without being fully aware of how they acquired such knowledge. In one revealing study, for example, Olson and Fazio (2001) exposed subjects to randomized information that systematically paired a novel cartoon character with positive or negative words (e.g., "excellent," "awful") and images (e.g., puppies, cockroach). Subjects developed positive (or negative) impressions of the cartoon character, consistent with the valence of the information paired with the object. Critically, however, subjects were unable to recollect the patterns of information that yielded their impressions (see also Dijksterhuis, 2004; Gawronski, Balas, & Creighton, 2014; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Olson & Fazio, 2002).

Measuring Automatic Processes

Having clarified what automaticity is, the next question is "How do we actually measure it?" At first blush, this query seems difficult to answer, especially given that the tool that most political scientists use to measure cognitive outputs—attitudes, beliefs, knowledge—is the self-report (Tourangeau et al., 2000; Zaller, 1992). If a mental process is relatively fast, unintentional, uncontrollable, and beyond full awareness, then asking people to report on aspects of their automatic thinking seems like a non-starter.

Or does it? Research by Brian Nosek and his collaborators reminds us to avoid confusing our measures with our concepts (Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). If the concept is automaticity, then its measures should tap into some or all of its characteristic traits, as Bargh (1994) urged us. This can entail new, indirect measures of attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge—which are known as implicit measures, and which this article says more about (Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Pérez, 2013; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009). But even self-reports can tap into some of automaticity's traits, especially its relative efficiency, albeit in somewhat cruder fashion. Consider the following example.

In 2008, Kate Ranganath and her associates measured people's attitudes in several domains using direct and indirect methods, with the former involving speeded self-reports (which increase efficiency) and the latter involving what is known as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (which short-circuits control, maximizes efficiency, and optimizes the lack of intention) (Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). Through a series of confirmatory factor analyses, these researchers established that the main distinguishing mark of these measures was not whether they appraised attitudes directly versus indirectly, but rather, whether these measures tapped cognitive processes that were automatic versus controlled. This finding highlighted a key distinction in human cognition: namely, whether an

underlying process is more automatic than controllable (Erisen 2009; Erisen et al., 2014; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Pérez, 2016).

So why not rely on self-reports—the staple of public opinion researchers—to assess automaticity? It's a great question, really, because self-reports are a compact way to assess the output of people's thinking. But if the goal is to join a measure to a concept in more perfect harmony, then the use of self-reports to appraise automaticity is akin to jimmy rigging your car when it breaks down: it temporarily gets the job done, but not in a fully satisfying or reliable way (Lemm, Lane, Sattler, Khan, & Nosek, 2008; Pérez, 2013). A better option is to use newer, indirect measures that more faithfully assess the varied aspects of automaticity, such as the "IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST (IAT), "AFFECT MISATTRIBUTION PROCEDURE (AMP)," and "AFFECTIVE PRIMING (AP)."

Implicit Association Test (IAT)

Imagine wanting to measure automatic evaluations of Latinos (cf. Pérez, 2016, 2010).[2] An IAT would accomplish this by having people rapidly classify single words that appear randomly on a computer screen, using one of two classification pairs.[3] The first of these assumes people negatively evaluate Latinos and positively evaluate Whites. Thus, the labels "Latino" and "Bad" appear in the upper left corner of the screen, while the labels "White" and "Good" appear in the upper right corner (see figure 1). If the word is a Latino exemplar (e.g., "García") or a word with negative connotation (e.g., "horrible"), people will press the "E" computer key. If the word is a "White" exemplar (e.g., "Smith") or a word with positive connotation (e.g., "wonderful"), individuals will press the "I" computer key. People sort 40 of these randomly selected words, allowing researchers to compute a person's mean response time to stimuli, with faster times indicating closer correspondence between the classification pair and a person's evaluation of these objects. Thus, if the exemplars are a cognitive match in a person's mind, that person will more easily and quickly be able to make the correct classification.



Figure 1. Hypothetical IAT classification scheme: "Latinos" negatively evaluated and "Whites" positively evaluated. Note: This scheme implies that the object "Latino" is mentally associated with negative connotation (i.e., "Bad"), while the object "White" is associated with positive connotation (i.e., "Good"). In other words, people have a negative evaluation of Latinos and a positive evaluation of whites.

In a second key task, people classify another 40 words, using the same stimuli and instructions. But now the classification scheme is *mismatched*, with "White" and "Bad" appearing together in the upper left corner of the screen, and "Latino" and "Good" appearing on the upper right corner of the screen (see figure 2). The quantity of interest, again, is the average response time to words, with faster times reflecting a closer correspondence between this classification pair and a person's own mental associations.



Figure 2. Hypothetical IAT classification scheme: "Whites" negatively evaluated and "Latinos" positively evaluated. Note: This scheme implies that the object "White" is mentally associated with negative connotation (i.e., "Bad"), while the object "Latino" is associated with positive connotation (i.e., "Good"). in other words, people have a negative evaluation of whites and a positive evaluation of Latinos.

Equipped with the average response time from each of these two blocks, one can test for the direction and intensity of people's implicit attitudes toward Latinos (relative to Whites). Insofar as people have negative implicit attitudes toward Latinos, they should classify stimulus words faster and with less errors when using the matched pair ("Latino"|"Bad—"White"|"Good") than when using the mismatched pair ("White"|"Bad"—"Latino"|"Good").

Published research on the IAT's relatively high degree of construct, discriminant, and predictive validity is extensive and still growing (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Intawan & Nicholson, 2018; Izuma, Kennedy, Fitjohn, Sedikides, & Shibata, 2018; Ksiazkiewicz, Vitriol, & Farhart, 2018; Nosek, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013; Pérez, 2010; Ksiazkiewicz, Vitriol, & Farhart, 2018). But how well does this measure capture automaticity? Recall the key lesson noted earlier in Bargh's (1994) chapter: to specify and corroborate the specific aspects of automaticity that are present in a cognitive process a researcher is studying. Viewed in this light, the IAT most strongly captures the unintentional and uncontrollable aspects of automaticity, and most weakly taps into its lack of awareness. In other words, individuals hardly intend to express rapidly spontaneous reactions to stimuli on a computer screen—they are merely following instructions—and they generally have a hard time editing, modifying or otherwise faking these responses (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Kim, 2003; Steffens, 2004).[4] But they *are* aware of the stimuli before them and that the exercise is taking place, even if they remain in the dark about how their responses reflect automatic evaluations that subsequently impact them (Gawronski et al., 2006; Pérez, 2013).

Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)

Similar to the IAT, the AMP centers on affective automatic reactions to stimuli. The AMP differs in that it calibrates these responses –not in milliseconds (ms)—but by the proportion of stimuli judged as positive or negative (Payne, 2009; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Imagine wanting to appraise automatic evaluations of African Americans. To this end, the AMP instructs people to rate single Chinese pictographs as pleasant or unpleasant. Prior to each Chinese pictograph, a photo of a Black or White male is presented as a prime, which people are asked to ignore. The logic behind the AMP is that affective reactions to a prime (e.g., a Black face)—reactions theorized to be spontaneous and hard to control—will spill over into people's rating of unrelated Chinese characters (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Therefore, insofar as people have automatic negative evaluations of Blacks, they will rate Chinese characters as more unpleasant when preceded by Black rather than by White primes. Subtracting pleasantness judgments of Chinese pictographs following Black primes from evaluations of these pictographs after White primes yields individual scores of negative implicit attitudes toward Blacks (Payne et al., 2005).

What aspects of automaticity does the AMP tap into? People taking the AMP are aware of the primes and target stimuli they rate (Payne, 2009). Moreover, like the IAT, the AMP

weakens control over evaluations of target stimuli (e.g., Chinese pictographs) by instructing people to respond fast (Payne et al., 2005). Yet, unlike the IAT, the AMP often directs people to avoid letting the primes affect their ratings of target objects—that is, to modify an otherwise impulsive response (Payne et al., 2005). Therefore, the AMP yields estimates of automatic evaluations that strongly reflect their unintentional and uncontrollable aspects: the first and second of Bargh's horsemen of automaticity.[5] However, some research has suggested that the AMP, at least as used in the American National Election Studies in 2008, may not always add explanatory power to models with measures of explicit attitudes, raising some question as to what it might be tapping (Ditonto, Lau, & Sears, 2013).

Affective Priming (AP)

First developed by the psychologist Russell Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio, Jackson, Dunto, & Williams, 1995; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; see also Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Bargh et al., 1996; Burdein et al., 2006), this computer-based measure assesses the speed, in milliseconds, with which people correctly identify the positive or negative connotation of a word presented after a prime. For example, in order to appraise racial attitudes via AP, researchers prime subjects with single photos of Black or White individuals. In light of each photo, subjects designate a target word (e.g., "terrible") as positive or negative by using specified computer keys.

Utilizing this measure, Fazio et al. (1995) primed subjects with single photos of Black, White, Asian, and Hispanic individuals. Each photo was presented for 315 ms, followed by a 135 ms interval before the presentation of a target word (e.g., "wonderful"), resulting in a total of 450 ms. This last quantity is referred to as the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), which is the lag between presentation of a prime and the onset of a target word. SOAs below 500 ms generally allow for processing of a prime to occur below complete awareness, as this is too brief a time period for people to recognize and react to a prime in a fully conscious manner. (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; Posner & Snyder, 1975). Indeed, as Lodge and Taber explain,

> The establishing of affect, meaning and intentions . . . is subterranean, each process following one upon the other in about a second of time. An inkling of conscious awareness begins 300-400 milliseconds after stimulus exposure, with a felt sense of positive and/or negative feeling, followed by a rudimentary semantic understanding of the concept . . . People can report similar like-dislike judgments in about 500-800 milliseconds . . .
>
> (Lodge and Taber (2013, p. 22; see also Erisen, 2009; Erisen et al., 2014).

AP yields facilitation scores, which can be computed in several ways. These scores generally indicate how much faster people respond to negative stimuli after a prime than to positive stimuli after that same prime. For example, to measure implicit attitude toward Blacks, one could (a) subtract average responses to positive words after Black primes from average responses to positive words in general; (b) subtract average responses to

negative words after Black primes from average response to negative words in general; and (c) subtract "b" from "a." In this way, negative scores would reflect more negative attitude toward Blacks (cf. Fazio et al., 1995; Kam, 2007).[6]

How does AP stack up to Bargh's horsemen of automaticity? Relative to the IAT and AMP, AP stands apart in its singular emphasis on presenting stimuli subliminally. This means people are completely unaware of the primes eliciting their evaluations and unaware of how these evaluations subsequently impact them (e.g., Burdein et al., 2006; Fazio et al., 1995; Kam, 2007). Consequently, the activation of these evaluations requires very minimal cognitive effort on the part of the subject (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986), thus positioning AP to effectively tap the efficient and unconscious aspects of automaticity: Bargh's (1994) third and fourth horsemen of automaticity.[7]

Automatic and Controlled Thinking in Politics

The discussion to this point suggests that if political cognition is a continuum, then the two bookends on this spectrum are automaticity and controllability. The more automatic a person's cognitive process is, the more Bargh's four horsemen appear in sharper relief. In turn, the more controlled a process is, the blurrier the outline of this caravan becomes. This simple sketch captures the essence of how psychologists, after more than 25 years of active research and evidence, generally understand human reasoning: it is comprised of two forms that can interact with each other in unique ways. But if psychologists have transformed our knowledge of how cognition works, the modal political scientist still understands human thinking as almost exclusively rooted in the controllable range described above: it is deliberative, intentional, and fully self-aware (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Nosek & Hawkins, 2010; Pérez, 2016).

In an effort to further inform and update this view, this article discusses how automatic and controlled reasoning can interact with each other according to three leading *dual process* models, with the *dual* here referring to the two types of thinking just described. The first two models—the "ASSOCIATIVE PROPOSITIONAL-EVALUATION (APE)" model and the "MOTIVATION AND OPPORTUNITY AS DETERMINANTS OF EVALUATION (MODE)" model—are native to psychology. In turn, the "JOHN Q. PUBLIC (JQP)" model is indigenous to political science. The goal here is not to convince political scientists that automatic and controlled thinking are enjoined in specific ways. Rather, the more modest goal is to encourage our political science colleagues to recognize that what many of us consider "real" political thinking is more complicated, and deeply animated, by automaticity.

Associative Propositional-Evaluation (APE)

The first dual process framework under consideration is the Associative Propositional-Evaluation (APE) model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). APE specifies that people's thinking is organized into two forms, which it dubs associative (i.e., automatic)

and propositional (i.e., controlled). Associative thinking generally entails the activation of mental associations in memory—what APE scholars call “affective gut reactions,” also known as automatic evaluations. Propositional thinking, on the other hand, consists of validating the information implied by one’s automatic evaluations through propositions, or what are known as self-reported attitudes.

APE researchers stipulate that associative reasoning is sparked before its propositional variety, yet the former does not always structure the latter. In some cases, it does, but in other instances, propositional thinking overwrites the output of one’s associative reasoning. In other cases, associative reasoning countermands the content of one’s propositional thinking. APE traces this fluidity to whether propositional reasoning produces output that affirms one’s automatic thinking. As Gawronski and Bodenhausen explain it:

> Affective gut reactions are translated into the format of a propositional statement (e.g., a negative affective reaction toward object X is transformed into propositional statements such as “I dislike X” or “X is bad”). To the extent that this proposition is consistent with other propositional beliefs that are considered relevant for an evaluative judgment, it may be endorsed in a verbally reported explicit evaluation. If, however, the propositional evaluation implied by the affective gut response is inconsistent with other salient propositions that are considered relevant, the inconsistency has to be resolved to avoid aversive feelings of cognitive dissonance . . .
>
> (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011, pp. 62–63)

Thus, although “gut reactions”—that is, automatic evaluations—are the first element evoked by associative reasoning, APE suggests that people use propositional reasoning to assess the veracity of these responses. From this view, then, the varied correlation between automatic and controlled evaluations often observed by scholars is less intriguing (Greenwald et al., 2009). When these correlations are high, APE suggests it is because people actually endorse the affective response evoked by associative reasoning. When these correlations are low, APE suggests it is because people propositionally disagree with the “gut reaction” they experience.

APE’s reconciling of this mixed correspondence between automatic and controlled evaluations across different studies and topic domains is this model’s virtue. It is also its main weakness. For all of its clarity in outlining how and why two types of evaluations might correspond with each other (or not), APE leaves much to be desired in terms of deepening our understanding about the influence of automaticity on political judgment and choice. True, one can reasonably retort that it is merely a matter of applying APE’s insights to the political realm—that if there was ever a domain where propositional reasoning thrives, it is politics, which normatively values deliberation. Yet more than a half century of political science scholarship reveals that effortful thinking of the propositional type is variable rather than constant, and often the exception to the rule of a dimly en-

gaged mass citizenry (cf. Achen & Bartels, 2016; Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992).

Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants of Evaluation (MODE)

In the discussion of the APE model, you may have noticed that it presumes a degree of motivation to engage in propositional thinking. Moreover, such motivation might be insufficient to engage in propositional thinking because individuals might also need the opportunity to follow through on it. These are, essentially, the main claims of the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants of Evaluation (MODE) model (Fazio, 1990; Fazio et al., 1995; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Olson & Fazio, 2009).

Although predating APE and the explosion of research on automaticity, MODE's insights have been usefully harnessed to explain the links between automatic and controlled thinking (Olson & Fazio, 2009). Fazio and his colleagues initially developed MODE to explain the ways through which spontaneous and deliberative processes shaped the connection between attitudes and behavior, where spontaneous processing refers to thinking that is generally automatic and low effort, and deliberative processing refers to thinking that is generally controlled and high effort.

According to MODE, contextual cues spontaneously trigger a person's automatic evaluations of categories, such as racial or ethnic groups. For some, these evaluations are weak; for others they are strong; and for others still, they are somewhere in between. Nonetheless, the key insight here is that stronger automatic evaluations are more easily evoked. And once they are spontaneously activated, they are ready to color one's subsequent behavior. Whether they do so, however, depends on a person's motivation and opportunity to edit the automatic evaluation tumbling out of one's head. For instance, some people in some settings might be motivated to reach a valid decision, whereas others might be motivated to curb a negative reaction against a racial group. In short, some people will feel more compelled than others to edit their automatic evaluation.

Nevertheless, sensing a personal urge to amend an automatic evaluation is often insufficient to block its downstream effects on behavior. Just as important, argue Fazio and his colleagues, is whether a person has the opportunity to act on this motivation (Fazio et al., 1995; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). For example, is there enough information to act on one's motivation to reach a valid decision? Does a person have enough time to correct an automatically triggered evaluation, thus allowing one to satisfy a motivation to act in a racially impartial way? As these and other examples attest, people can fully override their automatic response only if they have the motivation *and* opportunity to do so (Olson & Fazio, 2009; see also Devine, 1989).

Thus, in comparison to APE, MODE is clearer about when, why, and among whom automatic evaluations affect individuals' politics. For example, whereas APE emphasizes the

influence of propositional reasoning over automatic thinking, MODE contends that only some people—the motivated ones—engage in propositional thinking—an insight consistent with the variable degree of political awareness in the U.S. mass public (cf. Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Zaller, 1992). Furthermore, MODE argues that individuals will act on their motivation to engage in propositional reasoning *if* they are faced with favorable conditions providing the information and resources to act on this motivation—a claim consistent with expansive political science scholarship on the interplay between predispositions and political information (Taber & Young, 2013).

But if MODE seems to have politics stamped all over it, a closer look suggests otherwise. Inasmuch as MODE strengthens the grasp of motivation's moderating influence on the bond between automatic and controlled reasoning, the types of motivations that MODE identifies do not seem to be immediately applicable or desirable from the vantage point of political science. Consider the motivation to reach a valid decision. On the surface, this possibility makes sense. Yet a more careful look at contemporary U.S. politics suggests many citizens' political decisions often revolve around "being right" rather than "getting it right" (i.e., motivated reasoning) (Lodge & Taber, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Consider, too, a person's motivation to control prejudice (Fazio et al., 1995). This motivation also makes intuitive sense. But it is typically measured, via standard self-report survey items, by answering statements like "In today's society, it's important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any manner," which arguably lends itself to social desirability bias. In fact, consistent with this possibility, some evidence suggests these items tap into more than a motivation to control prejudice. Dunton and Fazio (1997, pp. 319–320), for instance, report that the same factor structure for their 17 items did not consistently emerge across the three convenience samples they administered them to.

The bottom line, then, is this: although MODE moves researchers closer to grasping how automatic and controlled thinking shape political judgments, it does not take us all the way there. For that, the discussion travels to Stony Brook University and relies on the insights of two of its leading political psychologists: Milton Lodge and Charles Taber.

John Q. Public (JQP)

Our discussion of APE and MODE suggests that psychologists have much to say about the connections between automatic and controlled thinking. Despite their useful insights, however, these models are notably silent about how these forms of thought affect political judgments, if at all. This matters because *political* decision-making has peculiar features that caution against a wholesale transfer of these psychological models to politics. For example, APE argues that the degree of correspondence between associative and propositional thinking regulates the degree to which automaticity impacts people's judgments. Such cognitive consistency, political scientists teach us, is a very high threshold for most members of the mass public to meet (cf. Converse, 1964; Sniderman et al., 1991). This suggests the political influence of automaticity might be more prevalent than what APE

anticipates. In turn, by focusing on motivation and opportunity, MODE claims that the impact of automaticity—as manifested in one's impulsive evaluations—is limited to some people in some cases. Yet political scientists find that politics often affirm, rather than modify, people's impulsive thoughts (cf. Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Mendelberg, 2001). Hence, MODE also risks mischaracterizing how ubiquitous automaticity is in politics.

In light of these blind spots, Lodge and Taber (2013); Kim, Taber, and Lodge (2010); and Kim (2019) have developed the most comprehensive effort to date to explain the dynamic relations between these forms of reasoning and politics, as enshrined in their John Q. Public (JQP) model (see also Erisen, 2009; Erisen et al., 2014). JQP, like APE and MODE, specifies two forms of reasoning, which it labels unconscious (i.e., automatic) and conscious (i.e., controlled). Like APE and MODE, JQP also views automatic reasoning as preceding its controlled variety. Yet unlike these social psychological models, JQP sees a robustly symbiotic relationship between automatic and controlled reasoning, with the output of the former directing the character of the latter. Indeed, JQP goes as far as claiming that controlled reasoning is a rationalization of the spontaneous affective reactions first triggered by one's automatic processes (Zajonc, 1980, 1984). More precisely, JQP claims that such affective reactions are the first element in citizens' cognitive stream, which matters because affect will color whatever comes after (i.e., *hot cognition*), either by directly shaping evaluations of political objects (i.e., *affect transfer*) or by retrieving considerations from memory that are congruent with this first response (i.e., *affect contagion*). As Lodge and Taber explain:

> Citizens might . . . consciously build evaluations of political figures, groups, or ideas from well-reasoned foundations . . . In the context of hot cognition, affect contagion, and affect transfer, however, such cold evaluations will be exceedingly rare . . . Far more common . . . will be the reverse causal pathway from evaluation to deliberation.
>
> (Lodge & Taber, 2013, p. 21)

Bear in mind, it is not that JQP deems citizens incapable of deliberative reasoning. But the affective response triggered by automaticity happens so quickly and without awareness, according to JQP, that the deck is stacked in favor of these automatic responses dictating the output of one's more controlled thinking. Indeed, the power of JQP lies in its unequivocal emphasis on automatic processing. Here, a political stimulus sparks an affective reaction on the order of milliseconds. And within a few milliseconds more, this affective response biases the sample of additional considerations one retrieves from long-term memory. By the time people are aware of what is going on, it is too late. Citizens simply rationalize their feelings.

These are a powerful set of insights. But some could say they seem deterministic, for unlike APE and MODE, JQP comes quite close to treating automatic and controlled reasoning as unitary rather than varying by degrees. This matters because it implies that controlled thinking nearly *always* depends on its automatic counterpart, which other political (Pérez, 2016) and social (Fazio et al., 1995; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011) psycholo-

gists have shown is not generally the case. Indeed, the latter collection of works marshal empirical evidence to show that the robust correspondence between automatic and controlled thinking represents a special, albeit quite important, circumstance. In APE, this case emerges when one's propositions affirm one's gut reaction (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). In MODE, this case arises when one has no motivation or opportunity to edit a spontaneous response (Olson & Fazio, 2009). Yet outside of these limited circumstances, APE and MODE suggest conditions under which the inherent symbiosis in JQP might be broken. For instance, engaging in propositional reasoning might lead to invalidation of one's initial "gut" reaction (per APE). Or, one might have a heightened motivation and opportunity to edit a spontaneously activated attitude (per MODE). All of this is to suggest that there are clearly some conditions under which the strong correspondence between automatic-controlled reasoning is attenuated (see Pérez, 2016), with the onus, again, falling on researchers to clarify the conditions under which this interface is strengthened (or weakened).

Automaticity in Traditional Political Science Terrain

This article has galloped across a vast conceptual landscape up to this point, all in the service of establishing that automaticity is prevalent in political cognition. But automaticity is not a new phenomenon. It has been lurking, at least in spirit, in some of political science's more established findings for quite a while now, but without being formally branded as such. Alas, if automaticity feels like a novel political concept, it is because political scientists have generally neglected to highlight, specify, and document its influence over political cognition, as well as lacked the appropriate measurement tools to study it.

Still skeptical? Consider scholarship on survey response—one of political science's mainstay research areas (cf. Achen, 1975; Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Converse, 1964; Feldman, 1989; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000; Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Scores of newly minted PhDs in political science and their advisors are thoroughly familiar with the leading explanation of how ordinary citizens form and express their opinions on political issues of the day. In this belief-sampling world, mass citizens do not have ready-made opinions on most things political (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Schwarz, 2007; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Zaller, 1992). What they have instead are considerations—beliefs, knowledge, identities, values, and so on—that are interconnected to each other via an associative network in long-term memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975). In this rendering, asking a survey question *primes* specific considerations in a person's memory, thereby activating them and heightening their mental accessibility, such that they become the basis of one's reported opinion.

This belief-sampling mechanism—and the top-of-the-head responses it produces—has been successful at explaining a variety of vexing empirical regularities, including the over-time instability in public opinion. For example, if a person reports weakly correlated replies to the same survey question at two points in time (Converse, 1964), it is because a

variety of situational factors conspire to produce different samples of considerations (Achen, 1975; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Zaller & Feldman, 1992).

In a strict sense, then, belief-sampling appears to be a deliberative and fully conscious process, and is often described as such in definitive accounts of this framework (Schwarz, 2007; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). But if one scratches the surface ever so lightly, traces emerge of automaticity's presence in opinion formation. Milton Lodge and Charles Taber have assembled these clues into a full-fledged model of how people really form their political opinions (Lodge & Taber, 2013; see also Burdein et al., 2006; Erisen et al., 2014; Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006). This is the JQP model previously discussed. Here, the focus is on explaining how JQP brings automaticity into sharper relief in the belief-sampling process behind survey response.

Automaticity's Dash Across Survey Response

Similar to other belief-sampling frameworks (Tourangeau et al., 2000; Zaller, 1992), Lodge and Taber (2013) construe long-term memory as a lattice-like network of nodes that consist of considerations: beliefs, knowledge, values, identities, and so on—the raw material of public opinion. These authors add a key insight to this view, stipulating that all considerations are affectively tagged. That is, all considerations are evaluated positively or negatively to a degree and stored as such in people's long-term memory. This sets the stage for what JQP dubs the *primacy of affect*: insofar as a consideration is activated in memory, so is its affective charge, which happens within milliseconds of broaching a survey question. Thus, rather than being a "cold," cognitive process, belief-sampling is deeply rooted in a bed of automatically activated feelings. Indeed, one of JQP's implications is that people's non-verbalized feelings, however rudimentary, are spontaneously freighted onto one's self-reported judgments, evaluations, or opinions—a phenomenon labeled *affect transfer*.

But there is another reason why affective tags matter so much to JQP. If, according to standard belief-sampling accounts, activation of one consideration spreads to related considerations in memory, then it stands to reason that activation of an initial affective tag will also spread to other affective tags. In fact, according to Lodge and Taber's (2013) reasoning, the valence and intensity of that first affective tag that is activated unfolds and fans out automatically in split-second fashion to other considerations sharing the same affective charge, resulting in what is known as *affective contagion*. In other words, people *automatically* recruit considerations to form opinions—not on the basis of semantic relations between nodes, but on the basis of the dominant affective charge that is sparked in those first few milliseconds when one hears or reads a survey question. The end result, per JQP, is that the controlled aspect of survey response—the conscious, relatively effortful, and intentional aspect of thinking about and answering a survey question—is used by people to rationalize and verbalize the affective responses they automatically experience when confronting a survey question. To use the terminology of this article, automaticity

drives the more controlled aspects of survey response that political scientists observe and measure.

Automaticity's Political Frontiers

If automaticity has been a ghost in the belief-sampling machine, scholars have treated its presence in other areas of political cognition as incarnate. Indeed, in several research areas, some political scientists have taken automaticity as a point of departure in order to better understand the underlying nature and motivations behind mass political thinking. "MOTIVATED POLITICAL REASONING" discusses some of the more important developments on these fronts, noting along the way some blind spots in the accumulated evidence.

Motivated Political Reasoning

One major offshoot of research on the political effects of automaticity involves motivated political reasoning (Burdein et al., 2006; Erisen, 2009; Erisen et al., 2014; Kraft, Lodge, & Taber, 2015; Lodge & Taber, 2005; Taber & Lodge, 2006; see also Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Rucker & Petty, 2004). The general idea here is that automaticity drives deliberative thinking, all in the service of reaffirming one's standing political beliefs. The main implication of this view is that conscious aspects of political thinking—the tip of the iceberg, so to speak—are structured by deeper, automatic processes that often escape scholarly scrutiny and measurement.

According to Taber and Lodge (2006), *all* political thinking is motivated—that is, it is conducted in the service of an ulterior goal. In politics, these authors suggest, citizens face a choice between two such goals: "getting it right" (accuracy) and "being right" (partisanship). Because contemporary politics enshrines partisan goals, it sets the stage for a type of political cognition that bolsters what one is already predisposed to believe.

This general effect is driven by the *primacy of affect*, discussed earlier. Since all political concepts are affectively tagged and automatically activated in memory, the recruitment of considerations to express an opinion, arrive at a judgment, or form an evaluation is biased by those split-second feelings triggered before one consciously deliberates. This yields a trio of empirical regularities. First, a *prior attitude effect* is produced such that citizens judge attitudinally congruent arguments as stronger than attitudinally incongruent claims. There is also a *disconfirmation bias*, whereby citizens resist attitudinally incongruent arguments and uncritically support attitudinally congruent ones. Finally, there is a *confirmation bias*: when free to choose, citizens seek out evidence and information that affirms what they already believe.

Normatively, this account clashes with cherished notions of how America's mass citizenry should behave: as open-minded, highly attentive, and obligingly effortful—all with the goal of getting a political decision "right." But this framework implies quite the opposite: that political cognition is about defending one's views at all costs.

Or does it? Pushed to its full extent, motivated skepticism implies that citizens are impervious to debate, updating, and forming accurate judgments. But work by David Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson (2010) suggests that citizens are not completely immune to disconfirming information: after encountering substantial evidence incongruent with one's beliefs, anxiety increases, which leads citizens to suspend their priors. This insight meshes with other political research conducted in a *dual process* tradition, which finds that inasmuch as motivated reasoning is the default mode of political thinking, its presence can be countermanded by the presence of new goals (e.g., accuracy) and/or shifts in individual-level incentives and circumstances (e.g., more time to reflect) (Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Pérez, 2016). The most constructive way to approach this diversity of findings is, it seems, to synthesize them further in order to further refine our collective answers to *why, when, whom*, and for *how long* motivated political reasoning takes hold.

Candidate Judgment and Choice

Automaticity has also trotted into research on how individuals judge political candidates. One of the more arresting findings here, to date, was produced by Cindy Kam and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2013). Through a series of clever lab and field experiments, these researchers establish that candidate name recognition—a staple of election campaigning—is mired in automatic processing. First, they show that subliminally priming individuals with a candidate's name is sufficient to increase support for that candidate—an effect occurring without people's awareness or control (Bargh, 1994). Second, they reveal that this boost in candidate support occurs because individuals automatically treat a candidate's name as an indication of the person's viability to win an election, rather than, say, his or her degree of political experience. Finally, the authors reveal that these automatic effects are not a function of the sterile lab environments they uncover it in, for they find that real-world actual exposure to a candidate's lawn sign increases support for the candidate in the placard.

Some scholars might construe this collection of findings as indicating that automaticity is the sole, unbridled workhorse of political judgment and choice. But other work has identified important constraints on automaticity's influence over candidate judgment and choice. Kam (2007), for example, shows that automatic evaluations of political candidates will spontaneously and uncontrollably spring forth on encountering candidate-related stimuli, but—and this is important—only in cases where other, non-diagnostic information about the candidate (e.g., partisan identity) is absent. This strand of findings aligns well with the spirit behind social psychology's dual process models, discussed earlier (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty & Caccioppo, 1986; see also Pérez, 2016). As these frameworks collectively imply, the sharp

edge of automatic processing is often blunted by individual differences in people's underlying motivation(s) and the situations they face.

The premise that automatic processes might be conditional is further supported by new work on undecided voters. Social psychologists first uncovered a curious phenomenon around 2008: individuals who self-reported being undecided about a pending election months before a contest actually possessed a kernel of a preference for one of the political contenders. This automatic preference for a candidate—measured weeks before the election, and indexed in milliseconds—steered these undecided voters toward said candidate on election day (Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, Zogmaister, & Amadori, 2008; Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008).

Political scientist Tim Ryan (2017A) has injected fresh insight into this vein of research through a series of imaginative studies. Ryan demonstrates that among voters who report being indifferent toward political candidates, their automatic evaluations of these contenders substantively predict their ultimate vote choices, with automaticity displaying a more checkered influence on voters who express ambivalence about political candidates or who report a clear preference for aspirants to political office.

Collectively, then, this research suggests that rather than looking for—and sometimes failing to find—average traces of automaticity in candidate judgment and choice (e.g., Kalmoe & Piston, 2013; Pasek et al., 2009), it pays conceptual and theoretical dividends to continue treating automatic processing as a highly heterogeneous phenomenon in mass publics.

Political Identity and Information Processing

Automaticity has also darted into the study of political identity and information processing, revealing that who "we" are—say, partisans, Americans, religious followers, and so forth—can structure how individuals sift through political information and employ it in their political decision-making (Taber & Young, 2013). For example, Alex Theodoridis (2017) demonstrates that Americans spontaneously and uncontrollably affiliate themselves with a major political party. This automatic form of party identification shapes voters' political evaluations independently of what they self-report, and often by bolstering their standing political beliefs (see also Theodoridis, 2013). This aligns with the work of Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood (2015), who find that Americans have developed deeply ingrained and automatically activated hostility toward out-partisans, which helps to explain the pervasiveness of political polarization in the U.S. mass public (Mason, 2018).

Moving beyond the immediate domain of partisan identity, other work illustrates how the outputs produced by citizens' information processing can themselves be automatic, insofar as they occur rapidly, uncontrollably, and without people's full awareness (Hamilton et al., 2015; Jacoby-Senghor, Sinclair, & Smith., 2015; Knoll, 2013; Phillips, Slepian & Hughes, 2018; Wilson, Hugenberg, & Rule, 2017). In this regard, Bethany Albertson (2011)

shows that religious appeals can lead some individuals to express favorable automatic evaluations of political candidates, as well as influence the propensity to engage in some political behaviors, such as rally attendance.

Finally, exciting work by Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz, Joseph Vitriol, and Christina Farhart (2018) reveals that voters hold preconscious impressions of candidates that are automatically triggered and precede their more fully conscious assessments of these actors. Drawing on insights from *dual process* models (Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014), these authors show that automatic candidate impressions structure citizens' self-reported judgments of candidates themselves, which meshes with the findings of other scholars working in this *dual process* model tradition, where *automaticity* can drive more controlled cognitive processes (Erisen, 2009; Erisen et al., 2014; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Pérez, 2016).

As illuminating as this research is, however, it is still in its infancy, which means there is much to be learned about the specific psychological pathways through which these automatic evaluations operate in people's political minds. This continued search for cognitive mechanisms entails producing more complete answers to the questions of how, when, and among whom automaticity structures information processing within mass publics. Indeed, when viewed from this angle, it is easy to appreciate the need for new research that can address the degree to which the influence of automaticity over information-processing is a function of the highly polarized, two-party context of the United States, where most of this type of research is conducted (Hetherington, 2009).

Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

The last subject this article touches on is the body of research that "started it all." In both social and political psychology, research on automaticity—especially automatic evaluations of objects—has been consumed by a focus on race (Banks, 2016; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Jacoby-Senghor et al., 2015; Payn, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), ethnicity (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2007; Pérez, 2010), and gender (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2016; Mo, 2015; Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001; Rudman & Kilanski, 2000; Smeding, Quinton, Lauer, Barca, & Pezzulo, 2016; Van Breen, Spears, Kuppen, & de Lemus, 2018).

This research has accumulated into a rich tapestry of findings (see Pérez, 2013, 2017, for reviews). In the interest of space, this section highlights two major empirical patterns in this quilt that have withstood the test of time and independent research teams. The first involves the unique nature of these automatic evaluations. One of the main takeaways from this research is that people's automatic evaluations of racial, ethnic, and gender groups are usually more negative, on average, than their self-reported evaluations of these same categories (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Pérez, 2016). The telltale sign is the modest degree of correlation between both types of evaluations observed by scholars (Greenwald & Nosek, 2009), suggesting these are different

outputs produced by different types of cognitive processes (i.e., automatic vs. controlled) (Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008).

The second major takeaway is that automatic evaluations of racial, ethnic, and gender groups exert an independent *direct* effect on individual judgments and choices that implicate these categories (Banks & Hicks, 2016; Greenwald et al., 2009; Malhotra, Margalit, & Mo, 2013; Mo, 2015; Winter, 2010). For example, Pérez (2010) establishes that negative automatic evaluations of Latinos directly increase opposition to immigration, independently of crucial, self-reported correlates of immigration policy preferences, including conservatism, education, authoritarianism, and ethnocentrism. This has been a popular strategy followed by other political scientists interested in establishing the conceptual validity of these automatic evaluations (Malhotra et al., 2013; Mo, 2015).

Nevertheless, in spite of the storehouse of knowledge about these automatic evaluations, much can be learned about the circumstances under which they impact people's political judgments. For example, research on the predictive validity of automatic evaluations (Malhotra et al., 2013; Mo, 2015; Pérez, 2010) illustrates that, *on average*, automatic evaluations impact people's political views, net of other possible influences.[8] More useful still would be investigations into when, why, and among whom these automatic evaluations affect political cognition, something that is slowly garnering more attention (e.g., Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Blinder, Ford, & Ivarsflaten, 2013; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Pérez, 2016; Ryan, 2017A). Just as important here is the question of *how* automatic evaluations are produced and with what consequences. This is a question of pathways, which requires more investigation into mediated effects of automatically activated evaluations (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010). For example, some research indicates that automatic evaluations wholly structure the nature and consequences of one's more deliberative thoughts (e.g., Lodge & Taber, 2013), yet other work suggests that one's automatic and controlled evaluations are independent from each other under various circumstances (e.g., Pérez, 2016). A constructive way forward would be to further theorize precisely when and why these dual processes merge or remain distinct.

Coda: The Four Horsemen's Next Destinations

Our essay has illustrated the expansive ground that the four horsemen of automaticity have traversed—a landscape that encompasses both social and political psychology (Gawronski & Payne, 2010; Pérez, 2013, 2016). But what are some emerging horizons toward which this quartet will turn to next? The possibilities are limitless, but this section concludes with a focus on three.

One area that has received scant attention in the political study of automaticity involves its origins—that is, what causes citizens to think in automatic ways or produce automatic judgments? The bulk of work on automaticity in political cognition has concerned itself with treating this phenomenon—and its various manifestations—as an independent variable. Our question here entails treating automaticity as an outcome, that is, as a dependent variable. This is not simply a matter of inverting automaticity's positioning in re-

search designs. Rather, it entails some heavy conceptual lifting (and attendant methodological innovations), to say the least. For example, consider automatic evaluations of racial and ethnic groups (Burdein et al., 2006; Greenwald et al., 1998; Pérez, 2016). Where, in politics, do these types of evaluations come from? What causes people to develop them? Social psychology suggests classical conditioning as a viable mechanism (Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Gregg et al., 2006; Mann & Ferguson, 2015; Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002; Rydell & McConnell, 2006), with some evidence in political science supporting this view (Pérez, 2016). But additional work is necessary to document in more painstaking detail the path(s) from information environment to citizen encoding, to citizen organization of the raw materials for automatic thinking.

A second realm that is wide open concerns the breadth of domains across which automaticity prances. The bulk of research on automaticity has focused on its implications for racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. But there is more to politics than these three crucial areas. The question, then, is the extent to which automaticity influences political judgment in other issue domains. Promising work on moral reasoning suggests that automaticity is rife in “right” and “wrong” areas of public affairs (Haidt, 2013; Ward & King, 2018; see also Ryan, 2017B). Other work suggests that on “gut issues” like gun control or crime (Taber & Lodge, 2005), or perceptions of the politicization of courts (Hansford, Intawan, & Nicholson, 2018), the influence of automaticity is primary and ever present. Yet these are thin slices of a larger corpus of political issues. And without further investigation into this matter, it remains unclear whether automaticity in political cognition is the rule—or the exception to it.

The last area that is in desperate need of attention from the four horsemen of automaticity is perhaps the most important, at least for the authors of this article. For all the knowledge that social and political psychologists have accumulated about the grip of automaticity over individuals’ thinking, most of the evidence comes from a narrow database: that is, individuals from majority groups. In the United States, this means that most of what is known about automaticity’s influence over political cognition is based on studies centering, almost exclusively, on non-Hispanic whites.

This focus is somewhat understandable. After all, collecting data from majority populations to study automaticity is more efficient and easier than studying hard-to-reach minority populations. But the risk here is that we might unwittingly construe the accumulation of evidence in favor of automaticity as an indication of a universal phenomenon that impacts *all* humans, in *all* settings, in the *same* ways (give or take some error, of course). Perhaps automaticity is a universal phenomenon. Yet there are already clues that it probably is not (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Livingston, 2002; Pérez 2016). All of which is to say that if social scientists are to draw such an imperialistic conclusion, it might go down more easily if they had firmer evidence to back it up. It is the hope of the authors of this article that social scientists will oblige their colleagues in this respect.

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Notes:

(1.) Freud originally made his pithy observation in 1899 (Freud, 2017), but it has proven so irresistibly discerning, that more than one political psychologist has drawn on it for scientific inspiration (Burdein, Taber, & Lodge, 2006; Pérez, 2016).

(2.) For more on IAT's in stereotyping and political decision making, see Spencer (2019) and Bos, Madonia, and Schneider (2019), both in this volume.

(3.) It is important to note that images can also be used as exemplars of attitude objects.

(4.) In fact, Cvencek et al. (2010) report that faked IAT scores are statistically detectable and partly correctable.

(5.) In other words, the AMP encourages individuals to correct the reactions they have to primes as a way to exercise personal control over these evaluations and the intention to use them (or not). The fact that these automatic evaluations emerge *despite* this encouragement is taken by AMP proponents as evidence of this measure's ability tap into the unintentional and uncontrollable aspects of automaticity.

(6.) This general approach to indexing AP scores is typical of many studies, although some variants exist.

(7.) Besides differing in their ability to capture automatic aspects of people's thinking, these measures also vary psychometrically in terms of their reliability (see Pérez, 2013, 2016).

(8.) But see Kalmoe and Piston (2013) and Kinder and Ryan (2017).

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