

## All Aboard? Solidarity Between People of Color and the Validated Votes of Black, Latino, and Asian Adults

Efrén Pérez  
Full Professor  
University of California, Los Angeles  
Department of Political Science  
Department of Psychology

Kasheena G. Rogbeer  
Doctoral Student  
University of California, Los Angeles  
Department of Psychology

Andrew M. Engelhardt  
Assistant Professor  
Stonybrook University  
Department of Political Science

Emily N. Ortiz  
Doctoral Student  
University of California, Los Angeles  
Department of Political Science

**Word Count: 7,945**

Accumulating research establishes that solidarity between people of color (PoC) unifies the political opinions of Black, Asian, Latino, and other racially stigmatized adults. Does solidarity also galvanize their political *actions*? By synthesizing research on PoC solidarity with insights about attitudes and behavior, we yield a set of pre-registered hypotheses that we evaluate by 1) testing whether solidarity galvanizes people of color to cast presidential ballots; and 2) pinpointing which PoC are more likely to engage in solidarity-based voting. Leveraging survey experimental data ( $N = 2,550$ ) gathered three weeks before 2024's presidential election, we find that inducing a sense of shared discrimination activated PoC solidarity, with this camaraderie boosting validated turnout among Black, Asian, and Latino adults. We corroborate this pattern in a 3-wave panel of these populations ( $N=3,627$ ), showing that solidarity measured at Wave 1 (pre-election) also reliably increased validated turnout independently of key covariates and time-invariant confounding. Finally, parting with previous work, we establish that solidarity significantly mobilized PoC who are Democrats, but demobilized PoC who are Republicans, implying these turnout gains benefit Democratic candidates. We discuss our results' implications for political scientists and practitioners.

At nearly 40% of the U.S. population and growing, people of color (PoC) are shedding their misnomer as “minorities,” with Black, Asian, Latino, and other racially stigmatized adults tipping the country’s demographic scales in their direction (Pérez 2021). These shifts have been recognized by non-Hispanic Whites – the current demographic majority – many of whom are now engaged in political backlash against these population trends and their implications for America’s culture and institutions (Craig and Richeson 2014; Abrajano and Hajnal 2016; Jardina 2019; Knowles et al. 2022). PoC sometimes counter these rollbacks by assembling coalitions based on shared grievances and mutual goals (Wilkinson 2015; Benjamin 2017; Cortland et al. 2017; Craig et al. 2022; Chin et al. 2023). These alliances are remarkable because they form *despite* the unique histories and social positions of racially stigmatized groups (Zou and Cheryan 2017), which generally trigger conflict rather than cooperation (McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain et al. 2007). Meta-analytic evidence reveals that a heightened sense of shared discrimination significantly boosts PoC solidarity, which then unifies their political opinions (Pérez et al. 2024a). For example, in the wake of shared discrimination, solidarity increases Latino support for pro-Black policies and Black support for pro-Latino policies – a pattern also displayed by Asian Americans, Middle Easterners and North Africans (MENAs), and Multi-Racials (Eidgahy and Pérez 2023; Pérez et al. 2025c). But does solidarity also influence people of color’s political *behavior*?

This is a deceptively simple question that tempts many political scientists to simply switch in a political action (e.g., voting) for a political attitude (e.g., issue support) when studying the effects of PoC solidarity. But theoretical and

methodological challenges stand in the way of drawing clear inferences about how solidarity shapes PoC's political action. In theoretical terms, it is notoriously difficult to predict specific behaviors (e.g., voting) from attitudes (Azjen 2014; Azjen, Fishbein, Lohmann, and Albarracín 2018). One reason for this is the relative ease of expressing attitudes versus engaging in political action (i.e., *cheap talk*). Political participation requires time, energy, and resources (Farrell 1995; Hanmer et al. 2014; Fraga 2016; Cuevas-Molina 2023; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Anoll 2022). And, since the probability that any one vote determines an election is trivially small (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), abstention is a rational response (Blais 2000). This means the direct effect from political attitudes to voting is likely mediated by mechanisms that are hard to pin down (Elster 1989). Yet social and political psychologists urge us to consider an array of cognitive, affective, and motivating factors that facilitate an attitudes-behavior connection (Fazio et al. 1986; Kunda 1990). One highly plausible mechanism here is PoC solidarity and how its possible convergence with partisanship drives voter turnout among people of color (Huddy 2013; Huddy et al. 2016).

However, even with a new theoretical synthesis, methodological obstacles limit researchers' ability to properly evaluate the link between attitudes and PoC's political behavior. Prior work approaches the attitude-behavior connection via tightly controlled lab experiments (Fazio et al. 1986). While internally valid, these studies are low in external validity given their scale (i.e., small, unrepresentative samples), the range of cases they evaluate (i.e., none or few participants of color), and the *mundane* and *psychological realism* of these studies (i.e., psychological processes and situations that are

uncommon in real-life politics). There are no easy single answers here. For example, one can run large-scale experiments among multiple populations of color to enhance the external validity of lab experiments on the attitude-behavior connection (Shadish et al., 2002). Yet these would ultimately only show that larger, controlled, and more heterogeneous studies yield something comparable to prior lab studies.

The question hanging in the balance, then, is whether an attitude-behavior connection reliably emerges in real-world politics where there is less researcher control, weaker pressure on participant compliance, and with respondents who are generally politically unaware (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lippmann 1922). One solution here is panel data that tracks PoC across survey waves during an election. This would enable researchers to observe PoC's political participation in the "wild," while retaining a respectable degree of control over the temporal order of solidarity and political behaviors, plus leverage over major confounding threats (e.g., time-invariant variables).

Finally, irrespective of whether available data are (quasi-)experimental, a remaining challenge to inferences about PoC's political behavior involves valid appraisals of the very actions that PoC solidarity is supposed to affect. In the case of our focal variable – voting – the most common and cost-effective measure is self-reports about turning out on election day. Research has long indicated these measures yield inflated voting rates (Belli et al. 1999; Bernstein et al. 2001), which compromise inferences about attitude effects on behavior. Many political scientists have innovated these self-reports, with clear improvements (Duff et al. 2007; Hanmer et al. 2014). Yet the gold standard here is still to directly confirm the act of voting without memory

limitations, social desirability pressures, and other extraneous factors that contaminate voting self-reports. This prospect is more feasible today given the availability of administrative voter records (Ansolabehere et al. 2012; Hersh 2015; Fraga 2018).

Our paper tackles these challenges by theorizing and testing when PoC solidarity motivates turnout. We argue that solidarity – a heightened sense of commitment and investment in coordinated activities with ingroup members (Leach et al. 2008) – significantly motivates voter turnout when electoral contexts field candidates who reflect the norms and beliefs of an ingroup. In the 2024 presidential election, this logic predicts that solidarity should have heightened support for a candidate perceived as racially inclusive (i.e., Kamala Harris) and to oppose one perceived as racially exclusionary (i.e., Donald Trump) (Westwood and Peterson 2022; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022). We therefore expect solidarity to increase turnout among PoC whose partisan identity, or candidate support, aligns with these norms.

Nonetheless, solidarity should not have uniform behavioral consequences for *all* PoC. Among people of color who are Republican, PoC solidarity clashes with the racially conservative norms and beliefs associated with the Republican Party (Zhirkov and Valentino 2020; Westwood and Peterson 2022). This tension can weaken turnout because PoC solidarity is misaligned with Republican partisanship (Huddy et al. 2016). Thus, we expect solidarity to mobilize PoC Democrats but demobilize PoC Republicans, with similar trends for supporters of Kamala Harris versus backers of Donald Trump.

We test these predictions using a large-scale survey experiment and extensive panel data on Black, Asian, and Latino adults – with both datasets straddling the 2024

presidential election and containing individuals' validated votes. Leveraging our survey experiment of Black ( $n = 850$ ), Asian ( $n = 850$ ), and Latino ( $n = 850$ ) adults – fielded three weeks before the 2024 presidential election – we establish that PoC solidarity mobilizes turnout. Specifically, exposure to shared discrimination catalyzed PoC solidarity, which was then reliably associated with downstream voting for Harris among Black, Asian, and Latino adults. This mobilizing pattern was driven by Democrat PoC. In contrast, solidarity had a demobilizing influence on Republican PoC. We corroborate this (de-)mobilizing pattern in our panel data. More precisely, solidarity levels at Wave 1 (June 2024) reliably galvanized PoC Democrats – but demobilized PoC Republicans – to vote for Kamala Harris in November 2024, net of key covariates (at Wave 1) and time-invariant confounders. We discuss the implications of these results for political scientists and political practitioners.

### **When Does Solidarity Mobilize Voter Turnout?**

A central challenge in predicting when solidarity will motivate political action is that attitudes rarely translate directly into behavior. Decades of accumulated research reveals a modest correlation between attitudes and behaviors caused by differences in people's motivations and opportunities to express attitudes that steer actions (Ajzen and Fishbein 1970; Fishbein et al. 1976; Kraus 1995; Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999; see also Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Specifically, one's attitudes (e.g., solidarity) will be more robustly predictive of behaviors (e.g., voting) in contexts that facilitate this activity (e.g., elections). Consider the 2024 presidential contest, which pitted Democrat Kamala Harris against Republican Donald Trump. This matchup provided a highly relevant

context for PoC to express strong solidarity to elect a presidential candidate of color deemed “friendlier” to their political interests (Rogbeer and Pérez 2026; Downs 1957). Indeed, prior work shows that individuals act on their attitudes when they have a vested interest in a specific domain (Johnson et al. 2014; Sivacek and Crano 1982) or if a domain is personally relevant (Fazio and Zanna 1978).

Applying this logic to Black, Latino, Asian and other people of color, solidarity gives racially stigmatized individuals a vested interest in the collective well-being of the broader mega-category, *people of color*. Indeed, experimental research shows that perceiving discrimination as shared across groups reliably heightens perceptions of solidarity (Cortland et al. 2017), which increases individuals’ investment in this mega-group and motivates coordination toward shared political goals (e.g., Eidgahy and Pérez 2023; Pérez et al. 2024a; Pérez et al. 2024b; see also Leach et al. 2008). Thus, our first hypothesis is that, when activated, PoC solidarity will drive Black, Latino, Asian and other racially stigmatized adults to turn out to vote when they have an opportunity to cast a ballot for a candidate that would potentially improve PoC’s well-being (H1).

### **Which PoC are Driven to Vote?**

Like most mega-categories, or superordinate groups (Gaertner et al. 1999; Transue 2007; Gaertner and Dovidio 2014), people of color are highly internally diverse, especially in their political orientations. Despite their generally pro-Democrat leanings (e.g., White and Laird 2020; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Wong et al. 2011), non-trivial shares of Black, Latino, and Asian Americans have long self-identified as Republicans (McClain and Carew 2018) – a fact underscored by the results of presidential elections

from 2016 onward, when Donald Trump mobilized Republican voters of color in visible fashion (e.g., Masuoka et al. 2018; Geiger and Reny 2024; Robertson and Tesler 2024; Fraga et al. 2025; Hartig et al. 2025; Wakefield et al. 2025). How should PoC's partisanship condition the influence of solidarity between them?

One possibility is that partisanship does *not* meaningfully condition solidarity's effects. Classic readings on the psychology of groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981) suggest that when a superordinate identity (e.g., PoC) becomes more salient relative to other possible categories, the centripetal forces behind ingroup formation reduces perceptions of internal differences when contrasted with an outgroup (Turner et al. 1987). Thus, solidarity should minimize internal political heterogeneity among PoC, making this ingroup more coherent and unified in its outlook and behavior.

Other work, however, implies that partisanship *is* a key attribute distinguishing "real" people of color from those who are not. Research indicates that partisanship polarizes political behavior among PoC (e.g., Geiger and Reny 2024; Hopkins et al. 2023; Alamillo 2019), with centrifugal forces separating Republican PoC from the majority of Democrat PoC (cf. Ellemers and Jetten 2013; Turner et al. 1987). At the mass level, Americans have developed strong associative schemas that distinguish Democrats from Republicans, especially in terms of racial politics, with Democrats deemed the racially liberal party and Republicans the racially conservative one (Westwood and Peterson 2022; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022; Alamillo 2019). These associations underscore the highly crystallized nature of partisanship among many PoC (e.g., White and Laird 2020; Hopkins et al. 2023), with some research demonstrating that many people of color

automatically associate their respective racial or ethnic group with the Democratic party (Pérez et al. 2025b). Consistent with this view, some studies suggest the convergence between one's racial or ethnic identity and Democratic partisanship politically mobilizes some PoC (Huddy et al. 2016).

These insights imply that solidarity should have contrasting effects for people of color who are Democrats and Republicans. Since the Democratic party is broadly viewed as racially inclusive and aligned with the interests of racial “minorities” (Pérez et al. 2025b; Westwood and Peterson 2022; Zhirkov and Valentino 2022), solidarity should boost voter turnout among Democratic PoC. In contrast, because the Republican party is widely perceived as racially exclusive and opposed to efforts that remedy racial inequalities and structural racism, heightened solidarity may discourage Republican PoC from turning out to vote for candidates who speak directly to the concerns of racially stigmatized individuals (Rogbeer and Pérez 2026). Thus, our second hypothesis (H2) is that solidarity will have a mobilizing effect on turnout among PoC who are Democrats, but a demobilizing effect among PoC who are Republicans.

While partisanship is widely considered individuals' “standing decision” about politics (Green et al., 2002; Hopkins et al. 2023), similar theorizing can apply to short-term forces like candidate characteristics. Much like Democratic PoC may be particularly likely to act on their solidarity to turn out to vote for more racially inclusive party platforms, so, too, do we think those higher in solidarity ought to be especially likely to turn out to vote if their preferred candidate is seen as more racially egalitarian. Conversely, supporters of racially exclusionary candidates should display the opposite

pattern. Since their candidate's politics conflict with the racially inclusionary spirit of PoC solidarity, these individuals will be less likely to turn out to vote. Thus, our third and final hypothesis (H3) predicts that solidarity will mobilize people of color who support a racially inclusionary candidate but demobilize PoC who support a racially exclusionary presidential aspirant. We present our hypotheses in Table 1, which were pre-registered along with our analytic plan for the experimental (<https://aspredicted.org/84vy-ydvq.pdf>) and panel data (<https://aspredicted.org/q6hk-nnn5.pdf>).

Table 1. Hypotheses About PoC Solidarity's Influence on Voting

Prediction:	Empirical signature:
H1: Solidarity mediates shared discrimination's effect on turnout	Positive indirect effect of shared discrimination on voting <i>through</i> solidarity
H2: Solidarity mobilizes Democrats but demobilizes Republicans	Positive downstream effect of solidarity on Democratic turnout but negative downstream effect of solidarity on Republican turnout
H3: Solidarity mobilizes Harris supporters, but demobilizes Trump supporters	Positive downstream effect of solidarity on Harris supporters but negative downstream effect on Trump supporters

### Study 1: Parallel Survey Experiments with People of Color

We first tested our hypotheses with a trio of experiments conducted in October 2024 in partnership with YouGov. YouGov recruited a nonprobability sample of eligible Black, Latino, and Asian American adults – America's three major populations of color (Pérez 2021) – from its respondent platform. These respondents consented to providing

their data to YouGov upon registering on the platform and complete surveys in exchange for points redeemable for small monetary rewards. YouGov then matched respondents to a politically representative modeled sampling frame of U.S. adults<sup>1</sup> and weighed the data according to their standard propensity score procedure. The final de-identified dataset consisted of representative samples of Black (N = 850), Latino (N = 850), and Asian (N = 850) American adults. Descriptive statistics are reported in A.1.

Our experiments followed prior published work by manipulating shared discrimination between PoC, measuring PoC solidarity, and then gathering validated turnout months after the election was over, after this information became available and accessible by YouGov. We innovated a previously used manipulation by activating shared discrimination between participants' racial ingroup and two minority outgroups simultaneously (rather than the typical one ingroup/one outgroup pairing). This freed us from the common assumption that shared discrimination only emerges between groups who are discriminated similarly to each other (i.e., as *foreigners* versus as *socially inferior*) (Pérez et al. 2024a; see also Zou and Cheryan 2017). The manipulation was informational in nature and closely resembled content participants could plausibly encounter in everyday news coverage.

Participants in the treatment group read an article describing rising hate crimes toward other communities of color. Here, Black adults read about hate crimes against

---

<sup>1</sup> The frame was constructed using the American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, public voter file records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 CES surveys. Each group of respondents were matched and weighted separately to produce the three final weights.

Latinos and Asians; Latino adults read about hate crimes against Blacks and Asians; and Asian adults read about hate crimes against Blacks and Latinos. The treatment was titled “Never Fully American, Always an Outsider: 2024 Highlights the Decades-Long Exclusion of **[Asian and Latino/Black and Asian/Black and Latino]** People in the U.S.” This news brief underscored how other racially stigmatized outgroups are discriminated like one’s own ingroup. The brief concluded with the following passage, linking the discrimination faced by the two racial minority outgroups to participants’ own racial group through an established *similarity* principle (Cortland et al. 2017):

“As a recent victim of one of these hate crimes toward **[Asian and Latino/Black and Asian/Black and Latino]** people stated (on condition of anonymity): “It’s so scary—and frustrating—that you can give so much of yourself to this country, and yet still be treated like an outsider, even if you and your family have been here for generations.” These words ring true among many **[African/Latino/Asian]** Americans throughout the U.S., who have been the targets of discrimination for decades.”

In turn, the control article was of comparable length and style but discussed the gradual extinction of giant tortoises. The full-length articles are reported in (A.2).

Post-treatment, participants completed a manipulation check before responding to three statements capturing PoC solidarity that have been previously validated across Black, Asian, and Latino adults in a factor-analytic context (Pérez et al. 2025a).<sup>2</sup> Using a 5-point scale, participants indicated their degree of (dis)agreement with: “I feel solidarity with people of color, which includes Asian, Black, and Latino people,” “The

---

<sup>2</sup> Participants replied to a true/false statement matched to their assigned condition: “The information I read highlighted how **[giant tortoises are in decline]** or **[Asian people/Black people/Latino people]** are still viewed as outsiders and not fully American.” Most Black (86.0%), Latino (83.8%), and Asian (89.4%) participants passed this check. Our analyses retain all participants, per our pre-registration.

problems of Black, Latino, Asian, and other people of color are similar enough for them to be allies," and "What happens to people of color in this country has something to do with what happens in my life as a [Black/Latino/Asian] person." The final item matched the race of respondents ( $\alpha_{\text{pooled}} = .725$ ). We create an averaged scale of these items and transform it to a 0-1 continuous interval ( $M_{\text{pooled}} = .658$ ,  $SD = .226$ ;  $M_{\text{Blacks}} = .704$ ,  $SD = .220$ ;  $M_{\text{Latinos}} = .645$ ,  $SD = .215$ ;  $M_{\text{Asians}} = .627$ ,  $SD = .237$ ).

Our focal outcome, turnout, is based on validated vote data gathered by YouGov that indicates whether or not panelists cast a ballot in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. We received these data for all our experimental participants in October 2025.

Our predictions call for two moderators: partisanship and candidate choice. We measured partisanship with the traditional ANES 7-point scale arraying adults from 1-strong Republican to 7-strong Democrat, which we rescale to a 0-1 range. Approximately half of the Black (67%), Latino (47%), and Asian (52%) respondents identified as or lean Democrat which, when pooled, amounts to 55% of our total sample. In turn, we capture candidate choice with a single item reflecting who respondents reported voting for post-election, which we code as 1 = Democrat, Kamala Harris or 0 = Republican, Donald Trump or others ( $M_{\text{Kamala}} = .668$ ,  $SD = .471$ ).<sup>3</sup>

### **Study 1's Results: PoC Solidarity Indirectly Shapes Voting Among Democrats**

Our first hypothesis tests whether solidarity transmits the effect of shared discrimination onto validated voter turnout. This is a direct extension of solidarity's

---

<sup>3</sup> Given the dichotomous nature of this item, the mean reported here reflects the proportion of the sample reporting a vote for Harris.

influence from political attitudes to political behavior. As a prediction involving mediation, support for (H1) entails observing a significant direct effect from shared discrimination to PoC solidarity, and then a reliable downstream association between PoC solidarity and turnout. Multiplication of these two coefficients should yield a positive indirect effect or ACME (average causal mediation effect). Table 2 displays the relevant quantities. Consistent with prior work (Chin et al. 2023; Engelhardt et al. 2025; Pérez et al. 2024a), these estimates are from a model that pools across racially stigmatized groups, given that the mega-category, *people of color*, operates like other ingroups in a coherent and unified fashion.

**Table 2.** Shared Discrimination Impacts Validated Turnout Through PoC Solidarity

	Solidarity (Mediator)		Validated Turnout (Outcome)
Shared discrimination (Treatment)	.037** (.011)	Solidarity → (Mediator)	.121** (.049)
Black participant	.078** (.014)		-.002 (.027)
Asian participant	.007 (.593)		.100* (.027)
Intercept	.620** (.011)		.617* (.037)
R <sup>2</sup>	.030		.014
N	1,620		1,620
ACME [95% CI]		.005 [.001, 010]	

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. In this framework, path 'a' relates the treatment to a mediator, while path 'b' relates a mediator to an outcome. The reported ACME multiplies the coefficients for paths 'a' and 'b',

which assesses whether this indirect path is statistically significant, while account for sampling variability (Hayes 2022). \* $p < .05$  and \*\* $p < .01$ .

Consistent with (H1), we find that solidarity's mediating political influence applies to PoC's voting behavior. Specifically, exposure to our shared discrimination treatment reliably increases PoC solidarity by nearly four percentage points (.037, SE=.011,  $p < .001$ ), which aligns with prior meta-analytic evidence on solidarity and PoC's policy opinions (Pérez et al. 2024a). Moreover, once activated, solidarity is positively and significantly correlated with casting a ballot in the 2024 presidential elections (.121, SE=.049,  $p < .001$ ). These two patterns, when multiplied together, yield a positive and reliable ACME or indirect effect (.005, 95% CI [.001, .010]) (Hayes 2022; Imai and Yamamoto 2013). These three layers of evidence provide clear support for (H1), namely, solidarity does appear to motivate PoC to turnout to vote.

Next, we turn to our evaluation of (H2), which anticipates the downstream relationship between solidarity and turnout to be significantly moderated by partisanship. This entails a mobilizing solidarity effect for Democratic PoC and a demobilizing one for Republican PoC. The raw results in table 3 confirm this hypothesis. As predicted, we observe a negative association between solidarity and turnout among Republican PoC (-.625, SE=.108, 95% CI [-.836, -.413],  $p < .001$ ). This relationship turns into a mobilizing pattern among Democrats, as indicated by the interaction term for this model (.999, SE=.143,  $p < .001$ ). This moderated pattern is depicted in figure 1, panel A. We see that a unit shift in a pro-Republican direction in partisanship scale reduces the influence of solidarity on turnout by about 63 percentage

points. In contrast, a unit shift in partisanship in a pro-Democrat direction increases solidarity's influence on turnout by about 37 percentage points (95% CI [.236, .513]).

**Table 3.** Estimating Turnout Likelihood from Solidarity and Shared Discrimination in (1) Republicans, (2) Trump Voters, and (3) Latino Adults

	Validated Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Solidarity	-.625** (.108)	-.300** (.085)	.181** (.084)
Democrat	-.486** (.097)	—	—
Solidarity x Democrat	.999** (.143)	—	—
Voted for Harris	—	-.187** (.065)	—
Solidarity x Voted for Harris	—	.415** (.104)	—
Black adult	—	—	.010 (.093)
Asian adult	—	—	.192** (.077)
Solidarity x Black adult	—	—	-.024 (.127)
Solidarity x Asian adult	—	—	-.143 (.110)
Shared discrimination	-.009 (.022)	.012 (.021)	-.011 (.022)

Intercept	1.010** (.066)	.960** (.045)	.578** (.059)
R <sup>2</sup>	.042	.020	.015
N	1,553	1,393	1,620


Note: OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. \* $p < .05$  and \*\* $p < .01$ .

Finally, clear support for (H3) is provided by solidarity's moderated relationship by candidate choice. The raw results in table 3 show that solidarity's association with turnout is significantly negative among Trump supporters, indicating another demobilizing effect (-.300, SE=.085,  $p < .001$ ). In turn, among Harris supporters, this pattern becomes a mobilizing one as reflected in the significant interaction between solidarity and Harris support (.415, SE=.104,  $p < .001$ ). This (de)mobilizing effect is depicted in figure 1 (panel B). Here, a unit shift in pro-Harris support marginally increases solidarity's impact on casting a ballot by about 11 percentage points (.114, 95% CI [-.06, .235]). This quantity amounts to a drop of nearly 30 percentage points among Trump supporters (-.300, 95% CI [-.466, -.134]), with the difference between both patterns being significantly different from each other at the 1% level.

Lastly, although not part of our pre-registration, we examine this solidarity mobilization pattern by race/ethnicity. The reasoning here is that, by virtue of Kamala Harris being both Black and Asian, members of these two racial populations would be significantly more mobilized by solidarity than their Latino counterparts (Bejarano et al. 2021). The null interaction terms in our third model suggest that solidarity mobilized members of all three groups to a similar extent, which aligns with prior work on the

internal dynamics of the mega-category, people of color (Engelhardt et al. 2025; Perez et al. 2025a). This pattern is depicted in panel C, in figure 1.

**Figure 1.** Solidarity's Downstream Association with Likelihood of Having Voted in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election by Partisanship, Self-Reported Presidential Vote, and Race/Ethnicity (Parallel Experiments).



### Study 2: Panel Survey of People of Color

The (de)mobilizing effects of solidarity observed in Study 1 depended on the activation of shared discrimination within a controlled experimental setting. However, real-world political environments are saturated with information and competing narratives (Rogbeer et al. 2025), raising concerns about whether effects detected in laboratory contexts translate into actual political behavior. To examine whether our predictions generalized to a more real-world electoral context, we recruited large samples of Black (N = 1,292), Latino (N = 1,296), and Asian (N = 1,039) American adults from AmeriSpeak, a probability-based panel of survey respondents.

Data was initially collected in June 2024 (Wave 1) through an online survey or telephone interview, which were available in English and Spanish. Panelists who consented to participate were compensated \$2 for completing a pre-election survey in which we embedded the same solidarity ( $\alpha_{\text{pooled}} = 0.720$ ,  $M_{\text{pooled}} = .621$ ,  $SD = .228$ ;  $M_{\text{Blacks}} = .674$ ,  $SD = .214$ ;  $M_{\text{Latinos}} = .588$ ,  $SD = .229$ ;  $M_{\text{Asians}} = .596$ ,  $SD = .230$ ) and partisanship (Democrat %: Black = 33.7; Latino = 55.8; Asian = 45.5) items from Study 1. Post-election, we obtained validated voter turnout and self-reported presidential vote choice from AmeriSpeak. Demographic statistics for each sample are provided in A.1.

### **Study 2's Results: Solidarity-Based Voter Turnout in "the Wild" of Electoral Politics**

To test whether solidarity with PoC had a bearing on whether PoC voted in the 2024 U.S. presidential election (H1), we fit a linear regression model that predicts validated turnout from solidarity while controlling for panelists' race, age, gender, nativity, education, and partisanship – variables that tend to be associated with voting

among racial minorities (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011). The results, presented in Table 4, were obtained using weighted estimates (weighted estimates in A.4).

Like Study 1, we find that PoC solidarity and turnout are positively correlated, although this pattern is imprecisely estimated ( $b = .030$ ,  $SE = .042$ ,  $p = .474$ ). However, when we examine this effect by partisanship (inclusive of leaners), we find clear support for (H2): solidarity was significantly mobilizing for Democrats (.165,  $SE = .056$ ,  $p < .010$ ), but significantly demobilizing for Republicans (-.145,  $SE = .063$ ,  $p < .050$ ). These raw results correspond to a 16.5 percentage point (.165, 95% CI [.056, .274]) increase in likelihood of turning out to vote per unit shift in the pro-Democrat direction and a 14.5 percentage point (-.145, 95% CI [-.269, -.021]) decrease in turnout probability per unit shift in the pro-Republican direction (Table 4, model 2).

In turn, when we examine whether these results are moderated by candidate choice, we find directional support for (H3), but again, this pattern is statistically imprecise. Specifically, we find that solidarity slightly boosted turnout for Harris supporters' (.032,  $SE = .045$ ,  $p = .473$ ), while weakly reducing it among Trump supporters' (-.093,  $SE = .061$ ,  $p = .131$ ), with the full pattern depicted in Figure 2, panel A. Importantly, the difference in solidarity's effect on turnout between Harris and Trump supporters is marginally significant (.125,  $SE = .075$ ,  $p = .095$ ), providing some support for (H3). Lastly, we again tested whether solidarity's effect vary across racial and ethnic subgroups. Consistent with the experimental findings, we find no robust evidence that solidarity's relationship with turnout differs across Black, Latino, and Asian respondents (Figure 2, panel C).


**Table 4.** Estimating Turnout Likelihood from Solidarity in (1) Pooled PoC Sample, (2) Republicans, (3) Trump Voters, and (4) Latino Adults

Validated Turnout				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Solidarity	0.030 (0.042)	-0.145* (0.063)	-0.093 (0.061)	0.030 (0.061)
Democrat	0.158** (0.020)	-0.023 (0.053)	0.072** (0.023)	0.160** (0.020)
Solidarity x Democrat	—	0.310** (0.084)	—	—
Voted for Harris	—	—	-0.054 (0.049)	—
Solidarity x Voted for Harris	—	—	0.125 (0.075)	—
Black adult	-0.096** (0.021)	-0.094** (0.021)	-0.071** (0.019)	-0.148* (0.060)
Asian adult	0.012 (0.027)	0.013 (0.026)	0.000 (0.022)	0.107 (0.071)
Solidarity x Black adult	—	—	—	0.078 (0.090)
Solidarity x Asian adult	—	—	—	-0.157 (0.111)
Intercept	0.410** (0.036)	0.504** (0.044)	0.704** (0.041)	0.410** (0.044)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.136	0.142	0.058	0.138
N	2039	2039	1736	2039

Note: OLS coefficient estimates controlling for age, gender, nativity, and educational attainment (see A.3 for full result table). Robust standard errors shown in parentheses.

\* $p < .05$  and \*\* $p < .01$ .

**Figure 2.** Solidarity's Downstream Association with Likelihood of Having Voted in the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election by Partisanship, Self-Reported Presidential Vote, and Race/Ethnicity (Panel Survey).



## Conclusion

Leveraging the 2024 U.S. presidential election, we examined whether feeling solidarity with PoC influenced political behavior among Black, Latino, and Asian Americans. Our findings advance research on PoC solidarity by moving beyond its well-established effects on political attitudes and demonstrating that solidarity can also shape political action under specific conditions.

Our results demonstrate that PoC solidarity impacts political behavior under conditions where this attitude is made salient. In our survey experimental data, priming shared discrimination reliably increased solidarity, which in turn raised the likelihood of turnout among Black, Latino, and Asian adults, with additional support provided by our panel dataset. These patterns align with research showing that attitudes are most likely to affect behavior when they are temporally proximate and salient at the time of decision-making (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2016; Tesler 2015). Harris's campaign messaging, which emphasized economic policy over identity-related appeals, may have limited the extent to which solidarity was activated as a mobilizing force (Rogbeer and Pérez 2026), which could explain some of the marginally weaker results observed in our longitudinal data. Taken as a whole, however, our results from both studies indicate that while solidarity can motivate turnout, its effects are context-dependent, emerging most clearly in settings where it is explicitly activated.

Our paper also establishes that the behavioral effects of PoC solidarity are contingent on partisan identity. Across our experimental and panel data, solidarity increased turnout among Democratic-identifying PoC but decreased turnout among

Republican-identifying PoC. This highlights that solidarity is not a uniform mobilizer; its effects depend on whether it aligns with or conflicts with other core political commitments (Huddy et al., 2016; Green et al., 2002; Westwood and Peterson 2022). Our moderated analyses of candidate choice generally mirrored the partisan patterns we observed in both datasets, suggesting that solidarity can both compel and repel PoC from group-based activity favoring the meta-category, people of color (Downs 1957).

Our research also underscores the influence of partisanship as a stable interpretive lens for evaluating solidaristic commitments around race and race relations (Zhirkov and Valentino 2020; Westwood and Peterson 2022). Partisanship is a highly crystallized, long-term predisposition that shapes how individuals interpret political information and attach meaning to social identities over time (Campbell et al. 1960). Political science research has long suggested that Asian and Latino Americans are unlikely to develop crystallized partisanship due to limited parental socialization (Cain et al. 1991). Recent studies challenge this view (Hopkins et al. 2023). They show that PoC identify with a political party and that this identification remains relatively stable over time (Hajnal and Lee 2011; White and Laird 2020; Pérez et al. 2025b).

Additionally, over the past decade, rising political polarization in the United States has increasingly linked the Democratic and Republican parties to racial egalitarianism and racial conservatism, respectively (Zhirkov and Valentino 2020; Westwood and Peterson 2022; see also Huddy et al. 2016; Mason 2016). Thus, since individuals typically vote for candidates perceived to represent their group's interests (Bejarano et al., 2021), the mobilizing force of partisanship is likely amplified when it is

reinforced by congruent social identities. For Democratic PoC, solidarity with racial minorities aligns with both partisan and racial commitments, explaining higher turnout. For Republican PoC, solidarity conflicts with dominant partisan norms, producing demobilizing effects (Mason 2023). This demonstrates that even salient superordinate identities, like “people of color,” do not automatically unify behavior (Gaertner and Dovidio 2014; Transue 2007).

In our experimental data, candidate evaluations were salient, temporally proximate, and experimentally constrained, allowing candidate choice to structure how solidarity translated into action. In the panel, where political behavior unfolded over a longer horizon and under weaker informational control, partisanship more consistently moderated solidarity’s effects than candidate choice. This implies that solidarity interacts more powerfully with psychologically entrenched orientations, rather than with transient or electorally proximate evaluations.

Finally, we note that our findings carry important implications for political practitioners and scholars of coalition politics. Appeals to shared discrimination and intergroup solidarity can mobilize voters of color, but such appeals are unlikely to be uniformly effective across partisan lines. For campaigns and advocacy organizations, solidarity-based messaging may deepen turnout among Democratic PoC while simultaneously alienating or demobilizing Republican PoC. For scholars, our results caution against treating political solidarity as a monolithic force and highlight the need to theorize more explicitly about conflicting identities and boundary conditions in models of PoC’s political participation.

## References

Abrajano, Marisa, and R. Michael Alvarez. 2010. *New Faces, New Voices: The Hispanic Electorate in America*.

Abrajano, Marisa, and Zoltan Hajnal. 2016. "Response to Sara Wallace Goodman's Review of *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics*." *Perspectives on Politics* 14(3): 820.

Alamillo, Raul. 2019. "Hispanics para Trump?: Denial of Racism and Hispanic Support for Trump." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 16(2): 457–487.

Ajzen, Icek, and Martin Fishbein. 1970. "The Prediction of Behavior from Attitudinal and Normative Variables." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 6(4): 466–487.

Ajzen, Icek. 2014. "Attitude Structure and Behavior." In *Attitude Structure and Function*, 241–274. Psychology Press.

Ajzen, Icek, Martin Fishbein, Stefan Lohmann, and Dolores Albarracín. 2018. "The Influence of Attitudes on Behavior." In *The Handbook of Attitudes*, Volume 1: Basic Principles, 197–255.

Anoll, Aaron P. 2022. *The Obligation Mosaic: Race and Social Norms in US Political Participation*. University of Chicago Press.

Anscombe, Stephen, and Charles Stewart III. 2005. "Residual Votes Attributable to Technology." *The Journal of Politics* 67(2): 365–389.

Bejarano, Christina, Nadia E. Brown, Sarah Allen Gershon, and Celeste Montoya. 2021.

“Shared Identities: Intersectionality, Linked Fate, and Perceptions of Political Candidates.” *Political Research Quarterly* 74(4): 970–985.

Belli, Robert F., Michael W. Traugott, Michelle Young, and Krista A. McGonagle. 1999.

“Reducing Vote Overreporting in Surveys: Social Desirability, Memory Failure, and Source Monitoring.” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 63(1): 90–108.

Benjamin, Andrea. 2017. *Racial Coalition Building in Local Elections: Elite Cues and Cross-Ethnic Voting*. Cambridge University Press.

Bernstein, Robert, Anita Chadha, and Robert Montjoy. 2001. “Overreporting Voting: Why It Happens and Why It Matters.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65(1): 22–44.

Blais, André. 2000. *To Vote or Not to Vote? The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory*. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay L. Schlozman. 1995. “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation.” *American Political Science Review* 89(2): 271–294.

Cain, Bruce E., D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlauer. “The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans.” *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (1991): 390–422.

Chin, Jason C., Gustavo A. Mártil Luna, Yuen J. Huo, and Efrén Pérez. 2023.

“Motivating Collective Action in Diverse Groups: Person of Color Identity, Prototypicality Perceptions, and Environmental Attitudes.” *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 14(6): 751–762.

Cortland, Clarissa I., Maureen A. Craig, Jenissa R. Shapiro, Jennifer A. Richeson,

Rebecca Neel, and Noah J. Goldstein. 2017. “Solidarity through Shared Disadvantage: Highlighting Shared Experiences of Discrimination Improves Relations between Stigmatized Groups.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 113(4): 547–566.

Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014. “On the Precipice of a ‘Majority-Minority’ America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans’ Political Ideology.” *Psychological Science* 25(6): 1189–1197.

Craig, Maureen A., Linda X. Zou, Hui Bai, and Michelle M. Lee. 2022. “Stereotypes about Political Attitudes and Coalitions among US Racial Groups: Implications for Strategic Political Decision-Making.” *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 48(9): 1349–1366.

Cuevas-Molina, Ivelisse. 2023. “Response Latencies as Evidence of Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Overreports.” *American Politics Research* 51(5): 670–680.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. Yale University Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." *Journal of Political Economy* 65(2): 135–150.

Duff, Brian, Michael J. Hanmer, Won-Ho Park, and Ismail K. White. 2007. "Good Excuses: Understanding Who Votes with an Improved Turnout Question." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71(1): 67–90.

Eidgahy, Kaumron, and Efrén O. Pérez. 2023. "How Wide Is the Arc of Racial Solidarity? People of Color and Middle Easterners and North Africans." *Political Research Quarterly* 76(1): 239–252.

Ellemers, Naomi, and Jolanda Jetten. 2013. "The Many Ways to Be Marginal in a Group." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 17(1): 3–21.

Elster, Jon. 1989. *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge University Press.

Engelhardt, Andrew M., Efrén Pérez, Seth K. Goldman, Yuen J. Huo, Tatishe Nteta, and Linda R. Tropp. 2025. "Testing the Stability and Temporal Order of People of Color Identity and People of Color Solidarity: New Evidence from a Survey Panel of Asian, Black, Latino, and Multiracial Adults." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Farrell, Joseph. 1995. "Talk Is Cheap." *American Economic Review* 85(2): 186–190.

Fazio, Russell H., and Mark P. Zanna. 1978. "Attitudinal Qualities Relating to the Strength of the Attitude-Behavior Relationship." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 14(4): 398–408.

Fazio, Russell H., and Carol J. Williams. 1986. "Attitude Accessibility as a Moderator of the Attitude-Perception and Attitude-Behavior Relations: An Investigation of the 1984 Presidential Election." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51(3): 505–514.

Fazio, Russell H., and Tamara Towles-Schwen. 1999. "The MODE Model of Attitude-Behavior Processes." In *Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology*, edited by Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope, 97–116. New York: Guilford Press.

Fishbein, Martin, Kerry Thomas, and James Jaccard. 1976. *Voting Behaviour in Britain: An Attitudinal Analysis*. Social Science Research Council.

Fraga, Bernard L. 2016. "Candidates or Districts? Reevaluating the Role of Race in Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1): 97–122.

Fraga, Bernard L. 2018. *The Turnout Gap: Race, Ethnicity, and Political Inequality in a Diversifying America*. Cambridge University Press.

Fraga, Bernard L., Yamil R. Velez, and Emily A. West. 2025. "Reversion to the Mean, or Their Version of the Dream? Latino Voting in an Age of Populism." *American Political Science Review* 119(1): 517–525.

Gaertner, Samuel L., John F. Dovidio, Mary C. Rust, et al. 1999. "Reducing Intergroup Bias: Elements of Intergroup Cooperation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 76(3): 388–404.

Gaertner, Samuel L., and John F. Dovidio. 2014. *Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model*. Psychology Press.

Geiger, Jessica R., and Tyler T. Reny. 2024. "Embracing the Status Hierarchy: How Immigration Attitudes, Prejudice, and Sexism Shaped Non-White Support for Trump." *Perspectives on Politics* 22(4): 1015–1030.

Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hajnal, Zoltan, and Taeku Lee. 2011. *Why Americans Don't Join the Party: Race, Immigration, and the Failure (of Political Parties) to Engage the Electorate*. Princeton University Press.

Hanmer, Michael J., Antoine J. Banks, and Ismail K. White. 2014. "Experiments to Reduce the Over-Reporting of Voting: A Pipeline to the Truth." *Political Analysis* 22(1): 130–141.

Hartig, Hannah, Scott Keeter, Andrew Daniller, and Ted Van Green. 2025. "Behind Trump's 2024 Victory: A More Racially and Ethnically Diverse Voter Coalition." *Pew Research Center*, June 26.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/06/26/behind-trumps-2024-victory-a-more-racially-and-ethnically-diverse-voter-coalition/>

Hayes, Andrew F. 2022. *Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis – A Regression-Based Approach*. New York: Guilford Press.

Hersh, Eitan D. 2015. *Hacking the Electorate: How Campaigns Perceive Voters*. Cambridge University Press.

Hopkins, Daniel J., Cheryl R. Kaiser, and Efrén Pérez. 2023. "The Surprising Stability of Asian Americans' and Latinos' Partisan Identities in the Early Trump Era." *Journal of Politics* 85(4): 1321-1335.

Huddy, Leonie. 2013. "From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 2nd ed., edited by L. Huddy, D. O. Sears, and J. S. Levy. Oxford University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0023>

Huddy, Leonie, Lilliana Mason, and Sandy N. Horwitz. 2016. "Political Identity Convergence: On Being Latino, Becoming a Democrat, and Getting Active." *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences* 2(3): 205–228.

Imai, Kosuke, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2013. "Identification and Sensitivity Analysis for Multiple Causal Mechanisms: Revisiting Evidence from Framing Experiments." *Political Analysis* 21(2): 141–171.

Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, I. M., Jason T. Siegel, and William D. Crano. 2014. "Expanding the Reach of Vested Interest in Predicting Attitude-Consistent Behavior." *Social Influence* 9(1): 20–36.

Knowles, Eric D., Linda R. Tropp, and Mao Mogami. 2022. "When White Americans See 'Non-Whites' as a Group: Belief in Minority Collusion and Support for White Identity Politics." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 25(3): 768–790.

Kraus, Stephen J. 1995. "Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Literature." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 21(1): 58–75.

Kunda, Ziva. 1990. "The Case for Motivated Reasoning." *Psychological Bulletin* 108(3): 480–498.

Leach, Colin W., Martijn van Zomeren, Sven Zebel, et al. 2008. "Group-Level Self-Definition and Self-Investment: A Hierarchical (Multicomponent) Model of In-Group Identification." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 95(1): 144–165.

Mason, Lilliana. 2016. "A Cross-Cutting Calm: How Social Sorting Drives Affective Polarization." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80 (S1): 351–77.

Mason, Lilliana. 2023. "Political Identities." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, 3rd ed., edited by Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, Jack S. Levy, & Jennifer Jerit. Oxford Academic.

Masuoka, Natalie, Hahrie Han, Vivien Leung, and Bang Q. Zheng. 2018. "Understanding the Asian American Vote in the 2016 Election." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 3(1): 189–215.

McClain, Paula D., and Albert K. Karnig. 1990. "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition." *American Political Science Review* 84(2): 535–545.

McClain, Paula D., Monique L. Lyle, Niambi M. Carter, et al. 2007. "Black Americans and Latino Immigrants in a Southern City: Friendly Neighbors or Economic Competitors?" *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 4(1): 97–117.

McClain, Paula D., and Jessica Carew. 2018. *Can We All Get Along?: Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics*. Routledge.

O'Brian, Neil A. 2024. *The Roots of Polarization: From the Racial Realignment to the Culture Wars*. University of Chicago Press.

Pérez, Efrén O. 2021. *Diversity's Child: People of Color and the Politics of Identity*. University of Chicago Press.

Pérez, Efrén, Bianca Vicuna, and Allison Ramos. 2024a. "Taking Stock of Solidarity between People of Color: A Mini Meta-Analysis of Five Experiments." *American Political Science Review* 118(3): 1549–1555.

Pérez, Efrén, Bianca Vicuña, and Allison Ramos. 2024b. "Shared Status, Shared Politics? Evaluating a New Pathway to Black Solidarity with Other People of Color." *Political Behavior* 46(2): 1151–1170.

Pérez, Efrén, Seth. K. Goldman, Yuen J. Huo, Tatishe Nteta, and Linda R. Tropp. 2025a. "Are Solidarity and Identification as People of Color Distinct? Validating New Measures across Asian, Black, Latino, and Multiracial Americans." *Political Science Research and Methods* 13(4): 962–978.

Pérez, Efrén, Jessica Hyunjeong Lee, and Gustavo Mártil Luna. 2025b. "Partisans of Color: Asian American and Latino Party ID in an Era of Racialization and Polarization." *American Political Science Review* 119 (4): 1599–1615.

Pérez, Efrén, Kasheena G. Rogbeer, Sydney Tran, et al. 2025c. "Rage Against the Machine? Why System Justification Drives (Some) Asian Americans to Spurn Racial Solidarity." *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 10 (3): 697–718.

Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." *American political science review* 62, no. 1 (1968): 25-42.

Robertson, C., and M. Tesler. 2024. "How Sexism Cost Both Biden and Harris Votes among Black Men." *Good Authority*, December 12.  
<https://www.socsci.uci.edu/newsevents/news/2024/2024-12-12-tesler-robertson-good-authority.php>

Rogbeer, Kasheena G., Jae Y. Kim, and Efrén Pérez. 2025. "Is Unity Durable among People of Color? Two Large Experiments Stress-Testing Solidarity between Black and Latino Americans." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 29(1): 157–169.

Rogbeer, Kasheena G. and Efrén Pérez. 2026. "Solidarity as a Bridge: Shared Discrimination Is Indirectly Associated with Voting Intentions among People of Color." *Advances in Psychology* 1: e328013.

Shadish, William, Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell. 2002. *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference*. Boston: Cengage Learning.

Sigel, Roberta S. 1964. "Effect of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 28(3): 483–496.

Sivacek, John, and William D. Crano. 1982. "Vested Interest as a Moderator of Attitude-Behavior Consistency." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 43(2): 210–221.

Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge. 2016. "The Illusion of Choice in Democratic Politics: The Unconscious Impact of Motivated Political Reasoning." *Political Psychology* 37 (S1): 61–85.

Tesler, Michael. 2015. "Priming Predispositions and Changing Policy Positions: An Account of When Mass Opinion Is Primed or Changed." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 806–824.

Transue, John E. 2007. "Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National Identity as a Uniting Force." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 78–91. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00238.x>

Wakefield, Derek, Bernard L. Fraga, and Colin A. Fisk. 2025. "Partisan Change with Generational Turnover: Latino Party Identification from 1989 to 2023." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*: 1–25.

Westwood, Sean J., and Erik Peterson. 2022. "The Inseparability of Race and Partisanship in the United States." *Political Behavior* 44(3): 1125–1147.

White, Ismail K., and Chryl N. Laird. 2020. *Steadfast Democrats: How Social Forces Shape Black Political Behavior*. Princeton University Press.

Wilkinson, Betina C. 2015. *Partners or Rivals? Power and Latino, Black, and White Relations in the Twenty-First Century*. University of Virginia Press.

Wong, Janelle, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Taeku Lee, and Jane Junn. 2011. *Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political Identities*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Zhirkov, Kirill, and Nicholas A. Valentino. 2022. "The Origins and Consequences of Racialized Schemas about U.S. Parties." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*.

Zou, Linda X., and Sapna Cheryan. 2017. "Two Axes of Subordination: A New Model of Racial Position." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 112(5): 696–717.