



Reformulating and Reassessing Solidarity's Downstream Effects: New Panel Evidence on People of Color During the 2024 Presidential Campaign

Efrén Pérez¹, Linda R. Tropp², Yuen J. Huo¹,
Seth K. Goldman² and Tatishe Nteta²

Abstract

Mounting evidence shows that shared identity among people of color (PoC) heightens inter-minority solidarity, which yields downstream support for pro-Black (affirmative action), pro-Latino (undocumented immigration), and pro-Asian (high-skill immigration) policies. Previous research detects this mediation pattern in one-shot experiments. This paper evaluates solidarity's downstream consequences in real-life politics by leveraging longitudinal data spanning the 2024 US presidential campaign. By reformulating solidarity as a developmental process, we reassess its influence in a unique three-wave panel of Asian, Black, Latino, and Multiracial adults ($N = 3,402$). We found that across groups, shared PoC identity (Wave 1) significantly increased inter-minority solidarity (Wave 2), which then boosted support for pro-Black and pro-Latino policies—but not pro-Asian policy (Wave 3). This pathway is robust to controls for potential confounds. We also found support for our hypothesized causal direction from PoC identity to PoC solidarity to support for pro-PoC policies (versus a reverse pattern).

Keywords

inter-minority solidarity, people of color, panel data, mediation, longitudinal analysis

Received: 2 October 2025; accepted: 8 June 2026

Introduction

In 2024, the proportion of people of color (PoC) in the US population reached nearly 43% (US Census Bureau, 2024). As racial diversity continues to grow in the United States, new research explains *when* and *why* Asian, Black, Latino, Multiracial, and other PoC express unified political views (e.g., Chan & Jasso, 2023; Chin

et al., 2023; Craig et al., 2022; Merseth, 2018; Sirin et al., 2021). This is a pressing topic because more

¹UCLA, USA

²University of Massachusetts, USA

Corresponding Author:

Efrén Pérez, Departments of Political Science and Psychology, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA.

Email: perezeeo@ucla.edu

than thirty years of political science research shows that the modal outcome in inter-minority politics is one of conflict rather than cooperation (Benjamin, 2017; McClain & Karnig, 1990; McClain et al., 2011; Wilkinson, 2015). Against this backdrop, psychological scientists are converging on a framework where common identification as people of color (i.e., PoC ID) catalyzes solidarity among them, which then produces favorable political attitudes toward other racially stigmatized outgroups (Cortland et al., 2017; Craig & Richeson, 2012; Zou & Ngum, 2025; see Pérez et al., 2024b for meta-analysis).

While the evidence for this political pattern is extensive, the inference that PoC solidarity is a causal mechanism remains open to vigorous debate. This challenge arises from two quarters. First, in most published experiments, PoC solidarity is a measured variable, not manipulated (e.g., Pérez et al., 2023, 2024a), which opens the door to confounding in the downstream path linking solidarity to politics (Imai & Yamamoto, 2013). While a limited set of studies uses design-based interventions where solidarity or its downstream impacts are manipulated (Craig et al., 2022; Rogbeer et al., 2026), these studies still occur under tightly controlled settings in which participants are asked to consider situations constructed for the purpose of the experiment, leaving open the question of whether solidarity's effects arise in real-life politics (Stanley & Campbell, 1963).

Second, prior solidarity experiments are one-shot and appraise the association between solidarity and related outcomes synchronously. Some of these studies bolster support for solidarity's impacts via sensitivity analyses (Pérez et al., 2024b) but cannot rule out feedback influence from policy support back to solidarity. Moreover, if taken at face value, findings from these experimental studies imply that solidarity's potential political impacts occur instantaneously, which overlooks the possibility that, under some circumstances (e.g., electoral campaigns), this process unfolds gradually over time across individuals as they take cues from relevant political actors, such as elected officials, candidates, and

other opinion leaders (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Zaller, 1992).

We break through these impasses by extending prior solidarity work in new theoretical and methodological ways. First, we formulate solidarity as a developmental process (Little, 2024) that is responsive to dynamic features in mass politics, such as electoral campaigns (Blumenau & Lauderdale, 2024; Hewitt et al., 2024; Jacobson, 2015; Sides et al., 2022; Vavreck, 2009). We see this prospect as complementing, not supplanting, the current view of solidarity as instantaneously affecting PoC politics, since it implies that this process may require, under some conditions, longer stretches of time to fully mature and manifest politically at scale.

Second, although published experiments on solidarity's effects display high internal validity, they also possess lower external validity (Stanley & Campbell, 1963). We believe this research area can benefit from well-designed, non-experimental studies that improve prior work's *mundane realism* (i.e., reflects real-world situations) and *psychological realism* (i.e., prompts natural, spontaneous reactions) (Aronson et al., 1998), but without fully compromising causal inferences. Prior experiments yield their evidence by exercising full control over stimuli among captive audiences, yet political psychologists teach us that most US adults are generally uninterested, unaware, and disengaged from mass politics *despite* campaign efforts to flood them with information (Converse, 1964; Delli, Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Thus, detecting solidarity's downstream consequences in electoral settings can strengthen current evidence by showing that its effects are also reliably catalyzed in the rough-and-tumble world of mass politics.

We address these blind spots using the American Multiracial Panel Study (AMPS), which contains extensive measures of PoC identity and solidarity (three items per construct), indicators of three pro-PoC policies (e.g., support for affirmative action, support for flexible policies toward undocumented immigration, and support for greater high-skill immigration), three survey waves spanning the 2024 presidential campaign,

coverage of multiple populations of color (Black, Asian, Latino, and Multiracial adults), and a large sample size ($N=3,402$). Although published work has tested the stability and temporal order of PoC identity and PoC solidarity (Engelhardt et al., 2025), the present research is the first to use a multi-wave longitudinal dataset to comprehensively evaluate whether, outside of experimental settings, solidarity mediates PoC identity's influence on downstream policy support. It also tests the possibility of bi-directional relations (i.e., a feedback loop between policy support and solidarity), while ruling out major threats to confounding (e.g., time-invariant factors).

Solidarity's Effects as Instantaneous and Causal

Current research appraises solidarity's downstream effects via one-shot experiments. Their results imply that the link between PoC identity and pro-PoC policies *through* solidarity emerges instantly. We reason that solidarity's immediate effects are plausible, but not exclusive of other pathways with different temporal rhythms. Since all three variables in this mediation chain are tested simultaneously in the existing studies, solidarity's rapid effects might be a function of measuring everything at once, making it unclear whether these emerge in settings where people are not captive to political information. Indeed, our contemporary media ecology is flush with non-political, consumer options, leading most adults to simply tune out explicit political content (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2013; Prior, 2007; Velez & Newman, 2019). This means participants' high degree of engagement in solidarity experiments might not reflect the reality of how these effects develop in actual mass politics.

Another challenge in one-shot solidarity experiments involves the causal inferences drawn from them. The typical study *manipulates* PoC identity via shared discrimination (Pérez et al., 2023) but *measures* solidarity and its downstream impact on pro-PoC policies. This design makes it difficult to infer solidarity's causal nature due to possible unobserved confounding in the downstream

relationship linking solidarity to policy support. Here, an unmeasured "third variable" could explain the relation between solidarity and political outcomes observed in prior work. Some studies cast doubt on confounding by adjusting mediation estimates for key covariates (Pérez et al., 2024b) or using design-based interventions to mitigate it (Cortland et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2026). Still, these experiments cannot rule out whether baseline differences in these variables upend causal inferences about solidarity (Georgeson et al., 2025). Moreover, solidarity's downstream influence on policy support could, in principle, loop back to PoC solidarity, which would complicate current understandings of this mechanism. Such a feedback process is plausible given that political elites regularly play a role in threading policy issues into bundles that seek to galvanize voters of color (Pérez, 2021; Zaller, 1992). This does not require appeals to a shared identity, but it does demand coordination and alliance-building between diverse individuals (Benjamin, 2017; Krochmal & Moye, 2021), which is the essence of PoC solidarity (Engelhardt et al., 2025). Available experimental studies cannot rule out this bi-directional relation between solidarity and policy support.

It's About Time: Toward a Developmental View of PoC Solidarity in Politics

In the present research, we alleviate these concerns by formulating a developmental view of solidarity's effects, whereby solidarity operates in a manner that evolves across time in real-life politics. Crucially, this approach acknowledges that, for the average American adult, politics is a distal realm (Lippmann, 1922) about which they have low awareness or understanding of its inner workings, its primary personalities, and its major institutions and processes (Luskin & Bullock, 2011). These tendencies are especially important to consider with respect to people of color, as some research has shown that they are generally *less* politically aware and informed than their non-Hispanic White counterparts (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), a pattern that may reflect PoC's marginalized status within America's racial

hierarchy (Masuoka & Junn, 2013). This is one of political science's major lessons about the nature of mass politics, and one that has been replicated across recent eras (Converse, 1964; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). Fundamentally, it implies that in the absence of long-run efforts to organize and mobilize PoC along solidarity-based lines, the default is one of tension and divisiveness between various people of color (McClain et al., 2011), since the US racial order often incentivizes inter-minority comparisons and competition (e.g., Zou & Cheryan, 2017).

Overriding this default toward inter-minority competition among PoC requires time to reorient their perspective from distinct racial subgroups to a larger, unified heterogeneous group. Across weeks and months, political actors (e.g., parties, candidates) implement strategies to optimally mobilize large swaths of their supporters (Zaller, 1992), including people of color. To fully appreciate this arduous "top-down" task, consider that all individuals—especially PoC—have access to numerous identity categories (Posner, 2017). These extensive identity portfolios mean that political actors must invest in heightening the salience of those identity categories that, in principle, can galvanize large numbers of supporters along a common identity dimension, such as the heterogeneous category, *people of color*. This involves political actors systematically privileging some identity categories over others, while providing members of these groups persuasive justifications about why it makes sense for them to become involved in politics (e.g., Chandra, 2012; Huddy et al., 2016; Rogbeer et al., 2025). For Black, Latino, Asian, and other non-White adults, this entails harnessing solidarity among them toward shared political ends, such as support for policies that implicate specific racially stigmatized outgroups.

Published longitudinal research indicates that both PoC identity and PoC solidarity are relatively stable and slow to change (Engelhardt et al., 2025). With test–retest correlations between .60 (for PoC solidarity) and .73 (for PoC identity), these constructs are deep wellsprings of intra-group coordination that PoC have gradually

accumulated through inter-minority coalitions and other political activities (Krochmal & Moye, 2021). Thus, energizing these concepts requires activating them (since they are stored in PoC's long-term memories), rather than "teaching" them to PoC from scratch. The former process means that stretching out assessments of identity–solidarity relations can provide a clearer view of how the link(s) between these constructs unfold over time in mass politics, such as presidential campaigns. Thus, our first hypothesis is that, over time, elevated PoC identity will boost expressions of PoC solidarity (H1).

Second, research shows that PoC solidarity is responsive to politics in local (Benjamin, 2017), state (Krochmal & Moye, 2021), and national (Wilkinson, 2015) settings. For instance, recent large-scale experiments with Black, Asian, and Latino adults reveal that in the 2024 election, a heightened sense of shared discrimination reliably influenced their voting intentions for Democrat Kamala Harris over other candidates *through* a heightened sense of solidarity (Rogbeer & Pérez, 2025). This kind of pattern hinges on the perceptions of similarity among these groups that solidarity generates (e.g., Cortland et al., 2017; Zou & Ngum, 2025). In the absence of this perceived similarity, some people of color feel less confident about allyship with other PoC and form partnerships with White people instead (e.g., Craig et al., 2022; see also Craig & Richeson, 2018). Thus, insofar as a shared identity as PoC is mobilized, we should expect PoC solidarity to have downstream impacts on other political outcomes during electoral contests, such as issue preferences in domains that implicate specific PoC, such as affirmative action (i.e., Blacks), high-skill immigration (i.e., Asians), and undocumented immigration (i.e., Latinos) (e.g., Kim et al., 2026; Pérez, 2021). Thus, we hypothesize that elevated solidarity levels will reliably increase downstream support for policies associated with specific PoC populations (H2).

Finally, prior research documents substantial variation in issue salience across mass publics (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Lenz, 2012; Vavreck, 2009), much of which stems from elite debates




Figure 1. Mean news stories per month by issue domain (2024).

over which issues should become the focus of political competition (Chong & Druckman, 2010; Egan, 2013; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). Issues that receive regular news media coverage become more salient among the mass public (i.e., *agenda-setting*). Such organic variation in agenda-setting means that some political issues will be more “top-of-mind” for people than other issues (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Zaller, 1992), leading them to incorporate their knowledge of these issues into their evaluations of relevant policy proposals. Among PoC, the increased salience of some policy domains over others should convey the importance of those issues, serving as a focal point for PoC to coordinate politically (Pérez, 2021).

Consider Figure 1, which tracks the average number of news stories on three issue domains theorized to be associated with PoC, i.e., affirmative action (Blacks), high-skill immigration (Asians), and undocumented immigration (Latinos). The first author collected these data from the *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Times*, and *Wall Street Journal*, spanning from January through December 2024.

Section 1 in the supplementary material (SM.1) explains how these news stories were retrieved and coded for this simple descriptive analysis. The figure reveals that undocumented immigration and affirmative action received far more voluminous coverage than high-skill immigration during this electoral cycle. Consistent with these trends, then, our final hypothesis is that solidarity’s effects will emerge most coherently on issues that were more salient during our data collection (H3).¹

Method

Data

We tested our hypotheses with three waves of survey data ($N=3,402$) from the 2023–2024 American Multiracial Panel Study (AMPS), which sampled Black, Asian, Latino, and Multiracial adults. In partnership with YouGov, a leading producer of high-quality survey data for academic research, we gathered these data from 2023 through 2024.

Sampling Procedure

YouGov uses propensity score matching to build nationally representative samples of target populations from its extensive US respondent panel. This allows their samples to closely resemble target population(s) on key census metrics, making them higher quality than most other opt-in online surveys (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2017). YouGov fielded Wave 1 of the AMPS between June 10–21, 2023, generating large sub-samples of Black ($n=985$), Asian ($n=678$), Latino ($n=975$), and Multiracial adults ($n=764$), for a total sample of $N=3402$. Each sub-sample is generally powered at 80% to detect a small effect (Cohen's $f^2 = .02$) in a model with three predictors and lags of those variables. For theoretical reasons we explain below, we analyzed the total pooled sample, which helps to preserve statistical power despite some attrition. We then tested the robustness of this approach to subgroup analyses.

For Wave 2, YouGov reached 52–70% of Wave 1 completes, yielding smaller but still informative Wave 2 sub-samples, which were collected between November 17 and December 12, 2023 (Blacks $n=514$, Asians $n=474$, Latinos $n=562$, and Multiracials $n=476$). YouGov then gathered Wave 3 data between July and August 2024, generating slightly smaller, but still statistically useful sub-sample sizes (Blacks $n=302$, Asians $n=345$, Latinos $n=368$, and Multiracials $n=364$). YouGov also supplemented re-contacts with fresh samples in Waves 2 and 3.

Participants

Survey respondents are adults residing in the US who are members of YouGov's respondent panel and who self-identify as Black, Asian, Latino, or Multiracial. Across the three survey waves, respondents had a mean age of 51 years old, 56% were female, and 39% possessed at least a bachelor's degree or more. Also, 16% and 36% of the sample consisted of second generation and third-generation immigrants, respectively. Our gathering of this data complied with APA ethical standards for human subjects and was approved

by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Measures

There are three main variables in our modelling framework: PoC identity, PoC solidarity, and support for three policies that implicate varied PoC communities (i.e., affirmative action, unauthorized immigration, and high-skill immigration), according to published work (Pérez, 2021; Pérez et al., 2024b). After describing below our coding of these variables, we report inter-correlations for our key variables (by policy issue) (see Table 1) and for all our policy items (by wave) (see Table 2). We also report basic descriptive statistics for our key variables (see Table 3).

We operationalize PoC identity with three previously validated statements completed on a scale from 1 (*strongly agree*) to 5 (*strongly disagree*) (Pérez et al., 2025). These items are: (1) 'Being a person of color is an important part of how I see myself'; (2) 'The fact that I am a person of color is an important part of my identity'; and (3) 'I often think about the fact that I am a person of color'. We recoded these items and combined the three items into a single scale where higher values reflect stronger PoC identity ($\alpha_{w1} = .89$, $M_{w1} = 3.40$, $SD_{w1} = 1.23$).

Using the same response options, respondents also completed three previously validated items capturing solidarity (Pérez et al., 2025). This short battery contains the items (1) 'The problems of Black, Latino, Asian, and other people of color are similar enough for them to be allies'; (2) 'I feel solidarity with people of color, which include Black, Asian, and Latino people'; and (3) 'What happens to people of color in this country has something to do with what happens in my life as a [Black, Asian, Latino, multiracial] person'. We also combined these items into an averaged index ($\alpha_{w1} = .81$) from 1–5, with higher values indicating more solidarity ($M_{w1} = 3.42$, $SD_{w1} = 1.02$).

In turn, we operationalized support for affirmative action with one item answered on the same response scale, which asked about their agreement on the following: *Allowing admissions*

Table 1. Correlations Between Primary Variables by Policy Issue Domain.

A.

	PoC ID _{w1}	PoC ID _{w2}	PoC ID _{w3}	PoC S _{w1}	PoC S _{w2}	PoC S _{w3}	AA ₁	AA ₂	AA ₃
PoC ID _{w1}	1.00								
PoC ID _{w2}	.74	1.00							
PoC ID _{w3}	.73	.77	1.00						
PoC S _{w1}	.62	.54	.56	1.00					
PoC S _{w2}	.53	.60	.54	.71	1.00				
PoC S _{w3}	.53	.54	.65	.70	.70	1.00			
AA ₁	.36	.35	.37	.39	.37	.39	1.00		
AA _{w2}	.37	.37	.41	.42	.41	.42	.59	1.00	
AA _{w3}	.40	.40	.45	.44	.45	.45	.61	.65	1.00

B.

	PoC ID _{w1}	PoC ID _{w2}	PoC ID _{w3}	PoC S _{w1}	PoC S _{w2}	PoC S _{w3}	DACA ₁	DACA ₂	DACA ₃
PoC ID _{w1}	1.00								
PoC ID _{w2}	.74	1.00							
PoC ID _{w3}	.73	.77	1.00						
PoC S _{w1}	.62	.54	.56	1.00					
PoC S _{w2}	.53	.60	.54	.71	1.00				
PoC S _{w3}	.53	.65	.65	.70	.70	1.00			
DACA ₁	.30	.28	.28	.44	.40	.41	1.00		
DACA _{w2}	.31	.32	.31	.45	.44	.41	.66	1.00	
DACA _{w3}	.29	.27	.30	.41	.40	.43	.68	.69	1.00

C.

	PoC ID _{w1}	PoC ID _{w2}	PoC ID _{w3}	PoC S _{w1}	PoC S _{w2}	PoC S _{w3}	HI ₁	HI ₂	HI ₃
PoC ID _{w1}	1.00								
PoC ID _{w2}	.74	1.00							
PoC ID _{w3}	.73	.77	1.00						
PoC S _{w1}	.62	.54	.56	1.00					
PoC S _{w2}	.53	.60	.54	.71	1.00				
PoC S _{w3}	.53	.54	.65	.70	.70	1.00			
HI ₁	.26	.22	.21	.39	.35	.33	1.00		
HI _{w2}	.23	.24	.23	.36	.39	.32	.71	1.00	
HI _{w3}	.17	.14	.21	.32	.28	.33	.69	.72	1.00

Note. All correlations significant at $p < .05$ or better. PoC ID = person of color identity, PoC S = person of color solidarity, AA = affirmative action, DACA = deferred action on childhood arrivals, HI = high-skill immigration.

officers to consider an applicant's race or ethnicity, along-side factors such as an applicant's high school grades, standardized test scores, and letters of recommendation, when evaluating students for admission into a college or university. We recoded responses so that higher

values reflect stronger support for affirmative action ($M_{w1} = 2.92$, $SD_{w1} = 1.43$).

We tapped policy opinions toward unauthorized immigration with a single item answered on the same scale, which asked about agreement

Table 2. Correlations Between Policy Issue Items by Survey Wave.

Wave 1.				
	AA	DACA	H1B1 visas	Legal visas
AA	1.00			
DACA	.32	1.00		
H1B1 visas	.28	.42	1.00	
Legal visas	.26	.55	.57	1.00
Wave 2.				
	AA	DACA	H1B1 visas	Legal visas
AA	1.00			
DACA	.41	1.00		
H1B1 visas	.30	.50	1.00	
Legal visas	.28	.58	.59	1.00
Wave 3.				
	AA	DACA	H1B1 visas	Legal visas
AA	1.00			
DACA	.42	1.00		
H1B1 visas	.31	.45	1.00	
Legal visas	.30	.50	.55	1.00

Note. All correlations significant at $p < .05$ or better. AA = affirmative action, DACA = deferred action on childhood arrivals.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables: PoC Identity, PoC Solidarity, and Policy Issues by Wave.

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
PoC ID	$M = 3.40, SD = 1.24, \alpha = .89$	$M = 3.66, SD = 1.23, \alpha = .90$	$M = 3.16, SD = 1.29, \alpha = .91$
PoC S	$M = 3.42, SD = 1.03, \alpha = .81$	$M = 3.37, SD = 1.03, \alpha = .81$	$M = 3.35, SD = 1.08, \alpha = .85$
AA	$M = 2.92, SD = 1.43$	$M = 2.81, SD = 1.41$	$M = 2.67, SD = 1.41$
DACA	$M = 3.50, SD = 1.36$	$M = 3.39, SD = 1.37$	$M = 3.28, SD = 1.40$
HI	$M = 3.57, SD = 1.09, \alpha = .73$	$M = 3.42, SD = 1.11, \alpha = .74$	$M = 3.29, SD = 1.12, \alpha = .71$

Note. Coefficient alpha (α) not reported for variables measured with a single item.
PoC ID = person of color identity, PoC S = person of color solidarity, AA = affirmative action, DACA = deferred action on childhood arrivals, HI = high-skill immigration.

on the following: *Renewing temporary relief from deportation for undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children.* We recoded replies onto a 1–5 scale so that higher values indicate greater support for this policy toward undocumented

immigrants, an issue that has particular relevance for Latino communities (Pérez, 2021) ($M_{wt} = 3.50, SD_{wt} = 1.36$). In turn, we measured support for high-skill immigration with two items on the same 5-point scale. The first one is

a generic statement about legal immigration, which prior work finds taps into support for high-skill immigration from Asian countries (Pérez, 2021): (1) *Expanding the number of visas available to legal immigrants who wish to enter the United States*; and (2) *Increasing the number of H1-B visas to allow U.S. companies to hire people to work in highly skilled occupations, such as engineering, computer programming, and high-technology* (Malhotra et al., 2013). We combined these items ($r_{w1} = .57$), such that higher values reflect greater support for this policy domain ($M_{w1} = 3.57$, $SD_{w1} = 1.09$).

Analytic Strategy

Prior work finds that the subgroups in the mega-category, *people of color*, generally operate in a coherent and uniform way in terms of psychological processes and political outputs (Engelhardt et al., 2025; Pérez et al., 2024b). Previous work also establishes the measurement equivalence of the items we use to operationalize our main constructs, PoC identity and solidarity (Pérez et al., 2025). Based on these insights, we estimate our models using the pooled sample ($N = 3,402$), which has the additional advantage of optimizing statistical power to detect even small effects, as described above. We then evaluated the robustness of any observed patterns by sub-population in our sample (i.e., Black, Asian, Latino, and Multiracial adults).

With three waves of data, on four populations, and three issues with varying salience, we built a longitudinal structural equation model (SEM) that allowed us to directly test the dynamics between PoC identity, PoC solidarity, and support for pro-PoC policy (Cole & Maxwell, 2003; Little, 2024). We used all available responses to our measures (i.e., no data exclusions) in a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) framework, which allowed us to retain cases and make use of all available information despite missing data (cf. Osborne & Sibley, 2020). Specifically, we estimated a three-wave model in which a single lag of each variable, at each wave, is included to account for potential confounding

from baseline levels of each construct (Georgeson et al., 2025; Rohrer & Murayama, 2023). This puts causal inferences regarding a mediator on sturdier ground. Additionally, the panel structure of our model (i.e., following the same individuals over time) lessens concerns about the confounding effects of time-invariant covariates, that is, quantities that are very unlikely to change over time. Thus, our emphasis is on evaluating core models for each policy domain (e.g., affirmative action, undocumented immigration) that include only our three principal variables and their corresponding lags. We then assessed the robustness of these parsimonious models by including key demographics, namely, age, gender, education, nativity, and race/ethnicity of respondents, as well as the level of their racial/ethnic identity centrality (see SM.4). Figure 2 depicts the most essential quantities that are estimated by our core SEMs.

The primary estimates of interest include the regression coefficients capturing the paths from PoC identity (Wave 1) to PoC solidarity (Wave 2) to support for pro-PoC policy (Wave 3) (bolded in solid black in Figure 2). Insofar as we find precisely estimated coefficients for each of these paths—independent of baseline levels and lags of these variables, plus time-invariant covariates—we will have evidence aligning with the view of PoC solidarity as a mediator of PoC ID's influence on support for pro-PoC policies. We estimated the same model separately for each policy domain in question.

Results

We began by analyzing our core longitudinal model depicting support for affirmative action, a Black-coded policy domain (Pérez, 2021).² Table 4 provides the fit statistics for this model, which indicate a strong fit to our data, with our CFI/TLI well above the .90 cutoff, an RMSEA in a desirable range (.05–.08), and an SRMR that falls under the .05 threshold (Brown, 2007). This degree of fit lets us interpret the relevant coefficients for this model with confidence.




Figure 2. Primary pathways and correlations in proposed longitudinal SEMs.

We expect solidarity’s mediating effect to manifest via a reliable path from PoC identity (Wave 1) to PoC solidarity (Wave 2) to support for affirmative action (Wave 3), with positive coefficients capturing the two links between these patterns. The relevant quantities are displayed under the column labeled affirmative action. These coefficients capture relationships that are independent of lags for each focal variable per wave, plus structural relationships between these variables and each other that do not involve our anticipated mediation path. We find that a 1-point increase in PoC identity (Wave 1) significantly boosts solidarity by .162 points ($SE=.018$, $p<.001$). In turn, we observe that solidarity (Wave 2) significantly increases downstream support for affirmative action (Wave 3) by .143 points ($SE=.020$, $p<.001$). The joint effect of these two coefficients yields a reliable indirect effect from identity to policy support *through* solidarity (.026, $SE=0.005$, $p<.001$), which supports our mediation hypotheses (H1a, H2a) in this policy domain.

Turning to the model depicting people of color’s support for renewal of DACA, a flexible

policy toward unauthorized (Latino) immigrants, we find another model with strong fit.³ This is evidenced by global fit indices well above .90 (CFI/TLI), a parsimony-based index in a highly desirable range ($RMSEA \leq .05$), and a relative absence of large model residuals ($SRMR \leq .05$) (Brown, 2007). When we interpret this model’s coefficients, we detect more evidence of solidarity’s mediating effects. As expected, we find that a 1-point increase in PoC identity (Wave 1) elevates PoC solidarity levels (Wave 2) by .174 points ($SE=.018$, $p<.001$). In turn, we find that a 1-point increase in PoC solidarity (Wave 2) boosts downstream support for DACA by nearly one-tenth of a point (.07, $SE=0.02$, $p<.001$). The indirect effect here is again positive and reliable (.014, $SE=.004$, $p<.001$). These findings are consistent with expectations and align with the descriptive data on the salience of these two issues in mainstream news coverage (see Figure 1).

What happens when we examine the least salient issue of this policy trio (as suggested in our news media analysis), support for high-skill immigration, a policy domain that is especially

Table 4. Solidarity Mediates the Effect of PoC Identity on Support for Pro-PoC Policies.

	Outcome					
	Support affirmative action _{W3}		Support undocumented immigration _{W3}		Support high-skill immigration _{W3}	
	Core	w/covariates	Core	w/covariates	Core	w/covariates
PoC solidarity _{W2} →	.143*	.115*	.070*	.114*	-.006	.020
Outcome _{W3}	(.020)	(.023)	(.019)	(.022)	(.021)	(.021)
PoC identity _{W1} →	.162*	.179*	.174*	.190*	.182*	.211*
PoC solidarity _{W2}	(.018)	(.022)	(.018)	(.021)	(.018)	(.022)
Indirect effect	.026	.024	.014	.025	-.001	.004
[95% CI]	[.017, .036]	[.013, .035]	[.006, .022]	[.014, .035]	[-.008, .006]	[-.004, .012]
CFI/TLI	.979/.947	.903/.885	.987/.967	.908/.886	.979/.951	.891/.855
RMSEA	.062	.061	.050	.062	.062	.071
[90% CI]	[.054, .070]	[.058, .064]	[.042, .058]	[.059, .065]	[.054, .069]	[.067, .074]
SRMR	.045	.067	.033	.072	.038	.092

Note. For all models, $N = 3,402$. Estimator = Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Standardized coefficients.

W_1 = Wave 1, W_2 = Wave 2, W_3 = Wave 3.

CFI = Comparative Fit Index. TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index. RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error. SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual.

Covariates: age, college education, gender, race/ethnicity, immigrant generation, partisanship, and racial/ethnic identity centrality. See SM.4 for coding of these covariates. *Significant at the 5% level or better (two-tailed).

relevant to Asian populations (Pérez, 2021)²⁴ Like our previous two models, we find similarly strong fit here, with CFI/TLI, RMSEA, and SRMR all meeting acceptable thresholds (Brown, 2007). This pattern of fit increases confidence in the inferences we can draw about solidarity's impact on support for high-skill immigration. We find that an increase in PoC identity (Wave 1) produces a reliable increase (.182, $SE = .018$, $p < .001$) in PoC solidarity (Wave 2), which aligns with H2a. However, in contrast to the other two policy issues, heightened PoC solidarity (Wave 2) has a negligible and statistically non-significant downstream impact ($-.006$, $SE = .021$, $p < .763$) on support for high-skill immigration, thereby precluding any inference of mediation. In SM.3, we show that this null result is not driven by scaling our survey questions on legal immigration and H1B visas. Looking at key correlates of these items (i.e., Asian status, partisanship, possessing a college education), we find that Asian

participants (more than other participants) are generally more supportive of these policy proposals, which are conceptualized as implicating the Asian community (Malhotra et al., 2013). We also find that PoC who strongly identify as Democrats (rather than Republicans) are more supportive of these proposals, which reaffirms polarization of immigration politics along party lines (Ollerenshaw & Jardina, 2023).⁵

Robustness Test 1: Inclusion of Covariates for Respondent Heterogeneity

Some readers may nonetheless wish to know how sensitive our inferences are to the inclusion of demographic and political variables that are likely correlated with each variable in our mediation chain, especially partisanship and racial identity centrality (Leach et al., 2008), which are crucial to the study of race, ethnicity, and US mass politics (e.g., McClain et al., 2009;

Table 5. PoC Identity’s Indirect Effect is Unmoderated by Racial/Ethnic Differences (with 95% Confidence Bands in Brackets).

	Affirmative Action	DACA	High-skilled Immigration
Original	.026 [.017, .036]	.014 [.003, .024]	–.001 [–.007, .005]
Without Black adults	.029 [.018, .040]	.012 [.003, .021]	–.001 [–.007, .006]
Without Latino adults	.022 [.012, .032]	.012 [.003, .021]	–.002 [–.008, .005]
Without Asian adults	.029 [.017, .041]	.014 [.004, .023]	.000 [–.008, .008]
Without Multiracial adults	.025 [.014, .036]	.017 [.008, .026]	–.001 [–.008, .005]

Pérez & Cobian, 2024; Wong et al., 2008). Under the columns in Table 4 labeled “w/ covariates,” we report the main estimates from refreshed models that include the following covariates in each path in our mediation chain: age, gender, college education, generation-since-immigration, race/ethnicity, partisanship, and racial identity centrality. The full results of these fuller models are in SM.4, along with a description of their coding.

Two patterns are worth highlighting. First, notice that across models, inclusion of these covariates generally weakens model fit, especially in terms of reduced CFI/TLIs below accepted levels and increases in model residuals (SRMRs) beyond conventional cutoffs (>.05). Still, if we accept these more saturated models despite their relatively weaker fit and proceed to interpret the main coefficients in our mediation framework, we arrive at the same substantive inference as before. On more salient issues during the 2024 presidential campaign (i.e., affirmative action, undocumented immigration), heightened PoC identity levels boost future PoC solidarity levels, which then increases future downstream support for these two policies. We also find, again, null solidarity-based effects on the least salient issue of the three, i.e., support for high-skill immigration.⁶

Robustness Test 2: Evaluating Moderated-Mediation by Race/Ethnicity

The previously discussed models are parsimonious insofar as they assume, based on published work with these data, that (1) our measures of key variables mean the same thing to the same degree across respondents who are Black, Latino, Asian, or Multiracial (i.e., measurement equivalence); and (2) there is general uniformity in the underlying solidarity-based process under investigation (i.e., homogenous dynamics) (Engelhardt et al., 2025; Pérez et al., 2024b). However, it is plausible that the mediation patterns we observed vary significantly by racial/ethnic differences between our participants. This is our second robustness test.

Table 5 re-estimates our core models by dropping each racial/ethnic sample of respondents while retaining the others, on a one-by-one basis. This lets us preserve the concision of our results while also formally evaluating possible moderation by race/ethnicity. A close look at Table 5 indicates that, both substantively and statistically, there is no significant moderation of our mediation patterns by racial/ethnic differences, which is reflected in the similarity of the re-estimated indirect effects and the overlap of their confidence intervals.

Table 6. Appraising Reverse Relations Between Support for Policy (Mediator) and Outcome (PoC Solidarity).

	Policy Outcome	
	Affirmative action	DACA
Policy support _{w2} → Solidarity _{w3}	.028 (.015)	.050* (.015)
PoC identity _{w1} →Policy support _{w2}	.115* (.024)	.042 (.022)
Indirect effect	.003	.002
[95% CI]	[.000, .007]	[.000, .005]
CFI/TLI	.982/.950	.987/.965
RMSEA	.060	.052
[90% CI]	[.052, .069]	[.043, .060]
SRMR	.040	.031

Note. For all models, $N=3,402$. Estimator = Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Standardized coefficients. W_1 = Wave 1, W_2 = Wave 2, W_3 = Wave 3. CFI = Comparative Fit Index. TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index. RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error. SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. *Significant at the 5% level or better (two-tailed).

Robustness Test 3: Bi-Directional Relations Between Solidarity and Policy Support?

So far, we have yielded evidence suggesting that on the more salient issues of affirmative action and unauthorized immigration, previous levels of PoC identity increase later support for each policy domain *through* PoC solidarity levels. But what about the reverse pattern—is there any evidence of a bi-directional relation between solidarity and policy support? Unlike cross-sectional designs, where switching the order between a proposed mediator (solidarity) and outcome (policy support) (Lemmer & Gollwitzer, 2017; Thoemmes, 2017) cannot credibly rule out a rival mediation process, our data’s longitudinal structure and modeling strategy provides some leverage over the temporal ordering of our theorized mediator (solidarity) and outcome (policy support) (Osborne & Little, 2024).

To this end, we re-estimate the core models reported in Table 4, but add to each one a bi-directional path, where previous policy support (Wave 2) also influences PoC solidarity (Wave 3).⁷ Table 6 yields weak evidence in favor of this reverse pathway. For example, although PoC

identity (Wave 1) is positively and reliably associated with support for affirmative action (Wave 2) (.115, $SE=.024$, $p<.010$), the connection between support for affirmative action (Wave 2) and PoC solidarity (Wave 3) is non-significant (.028, $SE=0.015$, $p<.060$), which undermines claims about mediation. In turn, we find that, while support for DACA (Wave 2) is positively associated with PoC solidarity (Wave 3), the relation between PoC identity (Wave 1) and support for DACA (Wave 2) is also insignificant (.042, $SE=.022$, $p<.060$), thereby undermining evidence for mediation. Thus, on both salient issues where we found solidarity’s anticipated downstream influence on policy support, there is weak evidence in our data of a bi-directional mediated pathway.

Summary and Implications

What do our results teach us about the relations between PoC identity, PoC solidarity, and support for policies involving people of color? We see our findings as affirming and extending current knowledge in this research area. First, although prior evidence consistently finds that a heightened sense of solidarity is associated with

support for pro-PoC policies, this evidence is derived primarily from one-shot experiments. Our longitudinal results here suggest that solidarity's downstream effects also emerge in real-world political settings, across a longer time frame, and are robust to key confounders. In this way, we learn that solidarity, as a mechanism, has a developmental nature—one that unfolds and evolves over time, which adds a new perspective about this key variable's rhythm. One way to extend these findings is to begin theorizing and formally evaluating relevant time-varying forces that might moderate this longitudinal process. We see no easy answers here, but we argue that the totality of the literature on PoC solidarity now opens up several promising avenues, including the specific pace of growth over time that these variables might take (Little, 2024).

Another lesson implied by our results concerns the role of issue salience in conditioning the positive indirect effects that PoC identity has on policy support *through* solidarity. We examined three policy domains that prior work establishes as being publicly associated with Blacks (affirmative action), Latinos (undocumented immigration), and Asians (high-skill immigration). Our efforts found that, insofar as the span of our sample was concerned, the two former issues had outsized prominence in public discourse during this time. What might explain this? One possibility is that Asians, even if they are a heavily immigrant population (Wong et al., 2008), are nonetheless viewed as more privileged than other people of color, specifically Blacks and Latinos. This aligns with the stereotyping of Asians as “model minorities,” that is, as more enterprising and less politically impertinent than their Black and Latino peers (Kim, 2023). However, this “positive” stereotype highlights Asians' stigmatized position in the racial order—they are positioned as “better” than other people of color but not worthy enough of full social inclusion (Zou & Cheryan, 2017). Indeed, this is precisely why many Black and Latino adults still consider Asians a racialized community that experiences extensive discrimination (Pérez, 2021), even if the modalities through which this exclusion is experienced vary.

Beyond this theoretical explanation, it is also possible that the null effects we observed for high-skill immigration reflect the fact that these policies only weakly implicate Asians. However, as we showed in SM.2, Asians are more supportive of high-skill immigration policies than other people of color in our sample, which makes this a less likely explanation. Moreover, although a ceiling effect could also be responsible for this null pattern on high-skill policy, Table 3 shows that the average level of support for high-skill immigration, per wave, registers around the midpoint of our scale, with plenty of variance around this mean score.

We believe this discrepant result for high-skill immigration might be at least partly explained by the lower salience of high-skill immigration in news discourse around this issue during the 2024 presidential election, which we depicted in Figure 1. Of course, it bears mentioning that this evidence is descriptive and our interpretation should be considered provisional, subject to research designs where news flows closely track respondents of color over time, which our data here does not permit. Until then, we think the null mediation patterns for this issue domain highlight how difficult it is to achieve political unity and action among people of color, since our anticipated effects emerged most coherently on the two issues that received voluminous and repeated attention in news coverage. This insight can be used to develop new experimental designs to evaluate how easily (or not) some policy issues become “PoC issues” for people of color, and what level and type of “activation” is required for such issues to mobilize members of this heterogeneous group.

Finally, we note that while our paper evaluated the longitudinal dynamics behind PoC solidarity, we have not cornered the market of ideas on the relationship between time and this mechanism behind inter-minority politics. For example, although we found weak evidence of a bi-directional mediated pathway, we consider this evidence still subject to additional empirical tests with new data. For example, psychological scientists might consider whether inducing support for

pro-PoC policies, on their own, can boost levels of PoC solidarity. This would imply a theoretical view that solidarity can be generated through one's mere support of policies that target various communities of color, which gives political candidates and their advisers the ability to harness solidarity by championing issues, *without* directly and explicitly calling on non-White individuals to political action based on their PoC identity. As the proportion of voters of color grows (Pérez, 2021), and many within the White majority continue to engage in reactionary and racist politics (Jardina, 2019; Knowles et al., 2022), clearer answers to these unknowns assume more urgency.

ORCID iDs

Efrén Pérez  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4952-5089>

Linda R. Tropp  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0203-7846>

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was supported by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. We do not claim or assume that this news data tracks our panel. Rather, we reason that the overall volume of coverage made some issues more salient, which may have measurable consequences on issue opinions.
2. Consistent with this group-implication claim, SM.2 shows that non-Black adults in our sample are significantly less supportive of pro-affirmative action policy than are Black adults.
3. In line with this group-implication claim, SM.2 shows that non-Latino adults in our sample are generally less supportive of DACA policy than are Latinos.
4. Again, in line with this group-implication claim, SM.2 shows that non-Asian adults in our sample are reliably less supportive of high-skill immigration than are Asian adults.
5. Furthermore, although our theoretical commitment is that these two policy proposals reflect a shared variable, SM.3 shows that when each is modeled as a separate outcome, the resulting SEMs exhibit poor fit. This suggests our original models (Table 4) are more informative in this context.
6. We do not formally compare our core models to our models with covariates because some readers may still find the model with covariates more informative, especially since we are operating in a correlational context, despite our data's longitudinal structure. We believe this to be a better approach since our analysis still does not exert full control over the mediator.
7. We did not change the order of PoC identity, which is a well-established cause of PoC solidarity and related downstream outcomes (e.g., Cortland et al., 2017).

References

- Ansolabehere, S., & Schaffner, B. F. (2017). Taking the study of political behavior online. In L. Atkeson & R. M. Alvarez (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of polling and survey methods* (pp. 76–96). Oxford University Press.
- Arceneaux, K., & Johnson, M. (2013). *Changing minds or changing channels? Partisan news in an age of choice*. University of Chicago Press.
- Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1998). Experimentation in social psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (pp. 99–142). McGraw-Hill.
- Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (2009). *Agendas and instability in American politics* (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Benjamin, A. (2017). *Racial coalition building in local elections: Elite cnes and cross-ethnic voting*. Cambridge University Press.
- Blumenau, J., & Lauderdale, B. E. (2024). The variable persuasiveness of political rhetoric. *American Journal of Political Science*, 68(1), 255–270. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12703>
- Brown, T. A. (2007). *Confirmatory factor analysis in applied research*. Guilford Press.

- Chan, N. K. M., & Jasso, F. (2023). From inter-racial solidarity to action: Minority linked fate and African American, Latina/o, and Asian American political participation. *Political Behavior*, 45(3), 1097–1119. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09750-6>
- Chandra, K. (2012). *Constructivist theories of ethnic conflict*. Oxford University Press.
- Chin, J. C., Mártir Luna, G. A., Huo, Y. J., & Pérez, E. (2023). Motivating collective action in diverse groups: Person of color identity, prototypicality perceptions, and environmental attitudes. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 14(6), 751–762. <https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221083818>
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2010). Dynamic public opinion: Communication effects over time. *American Political Science Review*, 104(4), 663–680. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000493>
- Cole, D. A., & Maxwell, S. E. (2003). Testing mediational models with longitudinal data: Questions and tips in the use of structural equation modeling. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 112(4), 558–577. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843x.112.4.558>
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and its discontents* (pp. 206–261). The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Cortland, C. I., Craig, M. A., Shapiro, J. R., Richeson, J. A., Neel, R., & Goldstein, N. J. (2017). Solidarity through shared disadvantage: Highlighting shared experiences of discrimination improves relations between stigmatized groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 113(4), 547–567. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000100>
- Craig, M. A., & Richeson, J. A. (2012). Coalition or derogation? How perceived discrimination influences intraminority intergroup relations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 102(4), 759–777. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026481>
- Craig, M. A., & Richeson, J. A. (2018). Hispanic population growth engenders conservative shift among non-Hispanic racial minorities. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 9(4), 383–392. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617712029>
- Craig, M. A., Zou, L. X., Bai, H., & Lee, M. M. (2022). Stereotypes about political attitudes and coalitions among U.S. racial groups: Implications for strategic decision-making. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 48(9), 1349–1366. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211037134>
- Delli Carpini, M., & Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. Yale University Press.
- Egan, P. J. (2013). *Partisan priorities: How issue ownership drives and distorts American politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Engelhardt, A. M., Pérez, E., Hill, S. K., Huo, Y. J., Nteta, T., & Tropp, L. R. (2025). Testing the stability and temporal order of people of color identity and people of color solidarity: New evidence from a survey panel of Asian, Black, Latino, and Multiracial adults. *American Journal of Political Science*. Advance online publication. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70009>
- Georgeson, A. R., Alvarez-Bartolo, D., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2025). A sensitivity analysis for temporal bias in cross-sectional mediation. *Psychological Methods*, 30(6), 1326–1344.
- Hewitt, L., Broockman, D., Coppock, A., Tappin, B. M., Slezak, J., Coffman, V., Lubin, N., & Hamidian, M. (2024). How experiments help campaigns persuade voters: Evidence from a large archive of campaigns' own experiments. *American Political Science Review*, 118(4), 2021–2039. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055423001387>
- Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Horwitz, S. N. (2016). Political identity convergence: On being Latino, becoming a Democrat, and getting active. *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences*, 2(3), 205–228. <https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2016.2.3.11>
- Imai, K., & Yamamoto, T. (2013). Identification and sensitivity analysis for multiple causal mechanisms: Revisiting evidence from framing experiments. *Political Analysis*, 21(2), 141–171.
- Jacobson, G. C. (2015). How do campaigns matter? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18, 31–47. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-113556>
- Jardina, A. (2019). *White identity politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kim, C. J. (2023). *Asian Americans in an anti-Black world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kim, J. Y., Pérez, E., & Rogbeer, K. G. (2026). Solidarity between people of color: Two blockage experiments suggest it is causal and resistant to a divisive threat. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 13(1), 65–75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2025.3>
- Kinder, D. R., & Kalmoe, N. (2017). *Neither liberal nor conservative: Ideological innocence in the American public*. University of Chicago Press.
- Knowles, E. D., Tropp, L. R., & Mogami, M. (2022). When White Americans see “non-Whites” as a group: Belief in minority collusion and support for White identity politics. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 25(3), 768–790. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13684302211030009>

- Krochmal, M., & Moye, J. T. (2021). *Civil rights in black and brown: Histories of resistance and struggle in Texas*. University of Texas Press.
- Krosnick, J. A., & Kinder, D. R. (1990). Altering the foundations of support for the president through priming. *American Political Science Review*, 84(2), 497–512. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1963531>
- Leach, C. W., van Zomeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M. L. W., Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., Ouwerkerk, J. W., & Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of ingroup identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(1), 144–165. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144>
- Lemmer, G., & Gollwitzer, M. (2017). The ‘true’ indirect effect won’t (always) stand up: When and why reverse mediation testing fails. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 69, 144–149. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.05.002>
- Lenz, G. S. (2012). *Follow the leader? How voters respond to politicians’ policies and performance*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public opinion*. Macmillan.
- Little, T. D. (2024). *Longitudinal structural equation modeling* (2nd ed.). Guilford Press.
- Luskin, R. C., & Bullock, J. G. (2011). “Don’t know” means “don’t know”: DK responses and the public’s level of political knowledge. *Journal of Politics*, 73(2), 547–557. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611000132>
- Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., & Mo, C. H. (2013). Economic explanations for opposition to immigration: Distinguishing between prevalence and conditional impact. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2), 391–410. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12012>
- Masuoka, N., & Junn, J. (2013). *The politics of belonging: Race, public opinion, and immigration*. University of Chicago Press.
- McClain, P. D., Johnson Carew, J. D., Walton, E., Jr., & Watts, C. S. (2009). Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: Measures of racial identity in American politics? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 471–485. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.102452>
- McClain, P. D., & Karnig, A. K. (1990). Black and Hispanic socioeconomic and political competition. *American Political Science Review*, 84(2), 535–545. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1963534>
- McClain, P. D., Lackey, G. F., Pérez, E., Carter, N. M., Johnson Carew, J., Walton, E., Jr., Watts Smith, C., Lyle, M. L., & Nunnally, S. C. (2011). Intergroup relations in three Southern cities. In E. Telles, M. Sawyer & G. Rivera-Salgado (Eds.), *Just Neighbors? Research on African American and Latino Relations in the United States* (pp. 67–104). Russell Sage.
- Merseth, J. (2018). Race-ing solidarity: Asian Americans and support for Black Lives Matter. *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 6(3), 337–356. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1494015>
- Ollerenshaw, T., & Jardina, A. (2023). The asymmetric polarization of immigration opinion in the United States. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 87(4), 1038–1053. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfad048>
- Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2020). Does openness to experience predict changes in conservatism? A nine-wave longitudinal investigation into the personality roots of ideology. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 87, 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103979>
- Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2024). The random intercept cross-lagged panel model. In T. D. Little (Ed.), *Longitudinal structural equation modeling* (p. 616). Guilford Press.
- Pérez, E. (2021). *Diversity’s child: People of color and the politics of identity*. University of Chicago Press.
- Pérez, E., & Cobian, J. (2024). Latino opinion and action in the struggle for America’s political future. *Annual Review Political Science*, 27, 87–106.
- Pérez, E., Goldman, S. K., Huo, Y. J., Nteta, T., & Tropp, L. R. (2025). Are solidarity and identity as people of color distinct? Validating new measures across Asian, Black, Latino, and Multiracial Americans. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 13(4), 962–978. <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2024.61>
- Pérez, E., Vicuña, B., & Ramos, A. (2024a). Shared status, shared politics? Evaluating a new pathway to Black solidarity with other people of color. *Political Behavior*, 46(1), 1151–1170. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-023-09863-0>
- Pérez, E., Vicuña, B., & Ramos, A. (2024b). Taking stock of solidarity between people of color: A mini meta-analysis of five experiments. *American Political Science Review*, 118(3), 1549–1555. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055423001120>
- Pérez, E., Vicuña, B., Ramos, A., Phan, K., Solano, M., & Tillett, E. (2023). Bridging the gaps between us: Explaining when and why people of color express shared political views. *Political Behavior*, 45, 1813–1835. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09797-z>
- Posner, D. (2017). When and why some social cleavages become salient rather than others? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40(12), 2001–2019. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1277033>

- Prior, M. (2007). *Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rogbeer, K. G., & Pérez, E. (2026). Solidarity as a bridge: Shared discrimination is indirectly associated with voting intentions among People of Color. *advances in psychology*, 1, e328013.
- Rogbeer, K. G., J. Y. Kim, & E. Pérez. (2025). Is unity durable among people of color? Two large experiments stress-testing solidarity between Black and Latino Americans. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 29(1), 157–169.
- Rohrer, J. M., & Murayama, K. (2023). These are not the effects you are looking for: Causality and the within-/between-persons distinction in longitudinal analysis. *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science*, 6(1), 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459221140842>
- Sides, J., Tausanovitch, C., & Vavreck, L. (2022). *The bitter end: The 2020 presidential campaign and the challenge to American democracy*. Princeton University Press.
- Sirin, C. V., Valentino, N. A., & Villalobos, J. D. (2021). *Seeing us in them: Social divisions and the politics of group empathy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sniderman, P. M., & Theriault, S. M. (2004). The structure of political argument and the logic of issue framing. In W. E. Saris (Ed.), *Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error and change* (pp. 133–165). Princeton University Press.
- Stanley, J. C., & Campbell, D. T. (1963). *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research*. R. McNally.
- Thoemmes, F. (2017). Reversing arrows in mediation models does not distinguish plausible models. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 37(4), 226–234. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2015.1049351>
- US Census Bureau. (2024). QuickFacts: U.S. population estimates by race and ethnicity. Retrieved March 17, 2026, from <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045224>.
- Vavreck, L. (2009). *The message matters: The economy and presidential campaigns*. Princeton University Press.
- Velez, Y. R., & Newman, B. J. (2019). Tuning in, not turning out: Evaluating the impact of ethnic television on political participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(4), 808–823. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12427>
- Wilkinson, B. C. (2015). *Partners or rivals? Power and Latino, Black, and White relations in the twenty-first century*. University of Virginia Press.
- Wong, J. S., Ramakrishnan, K., Lee, T., & Junn, J. (2008). *Asian American political participation: Emerging constituents and their political identities*. Russell Sage.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge University Press.
- Zou, L. X., & Cheryan, S. (2017). Two axes of subordination: A new model of racial position. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 112(5), 696–717. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000080>
- Zou, L. X., & Ngum, S. (2025). Status- and foreignness-based discrimination experiences shape feelings of similarity among people of color. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 121, 104794. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2025.104794>